## Facts

- Plaintiffs’ 1½-year-old son, Boyd, drowned in a swimming pool on defendants’ residential property.
- The pool was about 30 feet from a public street at a corner intersection; access barriers were incomplete, including a partially built wall with a four-foot opening aligned with the pool and a rail fence with gaps.
- Defendants kept animals (a cow, two dogs, and three horses) near the pool, visible from adjacent streets; defendants allegedly knew young children regularly used those streets and habitually entered the property to see the animals and play near the pool.
- The pool allegedly had opaque, dirty water; a sharp drop-off from shallow to deep areas; no steps, ladders, rails, or similar means of exit; and a slippery plastic lining on walls and bottom.
- Boyd lived diagonally across the intersection from defendants.
- For months before the incident, defendants’ teenage daughter babysat Boyd for plaintiffs and allegedly brought him onto defendants’ property to play near the animals and pool; plaintiffs alleged Boyd was on the property by defendants’ express invitation on the day of the drowning.
- No adults were allegedly present on defendants’ premises during weekday daytime hours; Boyd’s body was found in the pool around 11 a.m.
- Plaintiffs sued for wrongful death; the trial court sustained a general demurrer without leave to amend and entered judgment for defendants.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for a child’s drowning caused by an artificial condition on land under Restatement (First) of Torts § 339.
2. Whether earlier California decisions treating bodies of water as nonactionable “common dangers” barred liability as a matter of law at the pleading stage.
3. Whether the child’s alleged status as an invitee (or, alternatively, a trespasser) affected the existence of a duty sufficient to withstand demurrer.

## Decision

- Judgment reversed; sustaining the general demurrer without leave to amend was error.
- The complaint adequately pleaded a claim under Restatement § 339 based on foreseeability of child entry, the alleged unreasonable risk of the pool’s condition, and the child’s inability (given his age) to appreciate the danger.
- The court declined to treat swimming pools as categorically exempt from liability as “common dangers”; liability depends on all circumstances alleged.
- The complaint also pleaded facts supporting an invitation theory; in any event, the pleading was sufficient even if the child were treated as a trespasser because § 339 could impose a duty of reasonable care.
- Questions such as unreasonable risk, the child’s appreciation of danger, foreseeability of child presence, and reasonable precautions were for the trier of fact and could not be resolved on demurrer.

## Legal Principles

- A land possessor may be liable for harm to young children caused by an artificial condition if: (1) the possessor knows or should know children are likely to trespass, (2) the condition poses an unreasonable risk of death or serious harm, (3) the child because of youth does not discover or appreciate the risk, (4) the burden of eliminating the danger is slight compared to the risk, and (5) reasonable care is not used to eliminate the danger or protect children (Restatement (First) of Torts § 339).
- “Common” conditions, including bodies of water, are not automatically outside § 339; the analysis turns on the condition’s characteristics and the child’s age and capacity under the pleaded circumstances.
- On demurrer, the court assumes the truth of well-pleaded facts; where § 339 elements are plausibly alleged, issues of negligence and reasonableness are for the trier of fact.

## Conclusion

The court held that plaintiffs’ wrongful-death complaint plausibly alleged liability for a very young child’s drowning in a swimming pool under Restatement § 339 and could not be dismissed at the pleading stage based on a categorical “common danger” rule or the child’s property status.


King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340 (Cal. 1959)