King v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 420 Mass. 52, 647 N.E.2d 1196 (1995)

Facts

  • Boston University (BU) asked Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to place his papers in its special collections.
  • On July 16, 1964, Dr. King deposited a large collection of papers with BU and delivered a signed letter describing the arrangement.
  • The letter stated the materials would remain Dr. King’s legal property “until otherwise indicated,” but also stated he intended to transfer portions over time and that, upon his death, the deposited materials would become BU’s “absolute property.”
  • BU accepted the papers, indexed and preserved them, made them available to researchers, and devoted staff and resources to maintain and support the collection.
  • After Dr. King’s death, Coretta Scott King, individually and as administratrix of the estate, demanded return of the papers, asserting the estate retained title.
  • BU refused, asserting Dr. King made an enforceable charitable pledge of the papers to BU.

Issues

  1. Whether the July 16, 1964 letter and surrounding conduct permitted a finding that Dr. King made an enforceable charitable pledge of the papers to BU.
  2. Whether the pledge was enforceable based on consideration and/or BU’s reasonable reliance.
  3. Whether the “in the event of my death” provision was an unenforceable testamentary disposition or otherwise barred by statutes governing testamentary transfers or contracts to make testamentary dispositions.
  4. Whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the law governing charitable pledges.

Decision

  • The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed judgment for BU.
  • The court held the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Dr. King promised to transfer absolute title of the deposited papers to BU and that the promise was enforceable as a charitable pledge.
  • The court held the promise could be enforced based on consideration and/or reasonable reliance shown by BU’s actions in preserving, cataloging, and administering the collection.
  • The court rejected the argument that the arrangement was invalid as a testamentary transfer or barred by a statute of frauds provision governing contracts to make testamentary dispositions.
  • The court upheld the jury instructions as correctly stating the elements required to enforce a charitable pledge.
  • A charitable pledge may be enforced when the donor’s intent and the specificity of the promise support a finding of a commitment to the charity, and the charity shows consideration or reasonable reliance.
  • Delivery of property into a charity’s custody under a bailment-like arrangement may supply context for donative intent and may support the charity’s reliance when paired with a written promise of ultimate transfer.
  • A charity’s expenditures of effort and resources in response to a donor’s promise (including preservation, cataloging, staffing, and providing access) may constitute consideration and/or reasonable reliance sufficient to enforce the pledge.
  • A promise that becomes fully effective at or after death may be enforceable as a contractual obligation and is not necessarily an invalid testamentary disposition, particularly where the instrument is not a will or a contract to make a will and contains the essential terms of the commitment.

Conclusion

The court enforced Dr. King’s written commitment that the deposited papers would become Boston University’s absolute property, holding the jury could find an enforceable charitable pledge supported by BU’s consideration or reasonable reliance and not invalidated merely because full transfer was tied to Dr. King’s death.