## Facts

- Richard King retained Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf, P.A. to represent him in a dissolution-of-marriage action.
- The written fee agreement required a $25,000 nonrefundable retainer and specified hourly rates for firm attorneys.
- The agreement also included a “bonus” clause stating that if the matter settled or concluded by final judgment at the trial level, an additional final fee would be determined, considering “the results achieved” and complexity, and would be “fair and reasonable.”
- King paid all hourly bills in full and on time, totaling $342,989 (excluding any bonus fee).
- After the divorce decree, the firm demanded a $750,000 bonus; King refused.
- The firm sued King seeking a bonus fee (ultimately pursued as $1,150,000).
- After a three-day trial, the trial court awarded the firm $525,000 in additional “bonus” fees, plus costs and attorney’s fees incurred in the fee litigation, but denied prejudgment interest on the $525,000 award.
- King appealed the bonus-fee judgment; the firm cross-appealed the denial of prejudgment interest.

## Issues

1. Whether a dissolution-of-marriage fee agreement that provides for an additional “bonus” fee based on “results achieved” is an impermissible contingency fee barred by Rule 4-1.5(f)(3) of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar.
2. If the bonus-fee provision is enforceable, whether the firm is entitled to prejudgment interest on the additional fee award.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the $525,000 bonus-fee award.
- The court held the “bonus” provision violated Rule 4-1.5(f)(3) because it made part of the fee contingent on results in a domestic-relations matter.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether any additional compensation could be awarded on a permissible, non-contingent basis.
- The firm’s cross-appeal for prejudgment interest was effectively mooted by reversal of the bonus-fee judgment.

## Legal Principles

- In a domestic-relations matter, a lawyer may not charge or collect any fee whose payment or amount is contingent upon securing a divorce or upon the amount of alimony/support or a property settlement in lieu thereof. (Rule 4-1.5(f)(3), Rules Regulating the Florida Bar)
- A fee clause that conditions an additional fee on “results achieved” in a dissolution proceeding is treated as an impermissible contingency fee even if labeled a “bonus” and even if combined with hourly billing.
- A permissible reasonableness review of total fees is distinct from a contractual entitlement to a separate fee component keyed to success or outcome in a divorce case.
- When an outcome-based bonus provision in a divorce representation is unenforceable, any further fee recovery must be pursued, if at all, under a non-contingent theory consistent with the attorney-fee rules.

## Conclusion

The court invalidated and reversed enforcement of a divorce-case “bonus” fee provision tied to “results achieved,” holding it constituted a prohibited contingency fee under Rule 4-1.5(f)(3), and remanded for determination of any permissible non-contingent recovery.


King v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf, P.A., 709 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)