## Facts

- James L. Kisor, a Vietnam War veteran, sought VA disability benefits for PTSD in 1982.
- The VA denied the claim after concluding he did not have PTSD and instead had a non-service-connected personality disorder.
- In 2006, Kisor moved to reopen the claim and submitted additional materials, including service records confirming aspects of his combat history.
- A VA examiner diagnosed PTSD, and the VA granted benefits effective in 2006, not retroactive to 1982.
- The effective-date dispute depended on 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(c)(1), requiring the VA to “reconsider” a claim when it later receives “relevant official service department records” previously missing from the file.
- The Board of Veterans’ Appeals construed “relevant” to mean essentially outcome-determinative and found Kisor’s newly associated records not “relevant” because they did not establish a PTSD diagnosis.

## Issues

1. Whether the Court should overrule *Auer v. Robbins* and *Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.*, which direct courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation.
2. If *Auer* is retained, what limits must courts apply before deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation.

## Decision

- The Court declined to overrule *Auer* and *Seminole Rock*, relying largely on stare decisis.
- The Court vacated the Federal Circuit’s judgment and remanded because the lower court applied deference without using the required, stricter framework.
- The Court held that *Auer* deference applies only after a court (1) determines the regulation is genuinely ambiguous using traditional interpretive tools, (2) finds the agency interpretation reasonable, and (3) confirms additional prerequisites showing the interpretation reflects the agency’s authoritative, expertise-based, fair, and considered judgment.

## Legal Principles

- A court may defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation only if, after exhausting all traditional tools of construction, the regulation remains genuinely ambiguous.
- Even with genuine ambiguity, the agency’s interpretation must be reasonable and must fit within the ambiguity identified by the court.
- Deference is appropriate only when the interpretation is the agency’s authoritative or official position, not an ad hoc statement or a mere litigating position.
- Deference requires that the interpretive question implicate the agency’s substantive expertise.
- Deference is improper if the interpretation is not the agency’s fair and considered judgment, including when it is a post hoc rationalization or creates unfair surprise (such as upsetting serious reliance interests or imposing unexpected retroactive consequences).

## Conclusion

The Court preserved *Auer* deference but narrowed it into a limited doctrine: courts must first do independent, full regulatory interpretation and may defer only when genuine ambiguity remains and the agency’s reasonable view satisfies strict conditions of authoritativeness, expertise, and fairness; the case was vacated and remanded for application of that framework.


Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019)