## Facts

- Dale and Gail Klemm were spouses in an uncontested dissolution proceeding with two minor children; they reported no meaningful property to divide and waived spousal support.
- Gail initially filed for dissolution without counsel; attorney Catherine S. Bailey, a friend of both spouses, assisted without compensation.
- The parties agreed to joint custody and that Gail would waive child support from Dale.
- Because Gail received AFDC, the court referred child support to the county’s Family Support Division, which recommended an order requiring Dale to pay $25 per month per child to the county as reimbursement.
- Bailey filed an objection to the county’s recommendation on behalf of Gail, and later appeared seeking to represent Dale on the support issue, asserting the spouses were aligned against the county.
- The trial court questioned Gail and perceived that she did not clearly understand Bailey’s role, then ruled Bailey could represent neither spouse due to a conflict of interest.
- After a continuance, written consents to dual representation signed by both spouses were filed, stating each had been advised of possible conflicts and still desired Bailey’s joint representation.
- The trial court denied the request despite the consents, and the spouses sought a writ of mandate directing the court to allow dual representation.

## Issues

1. Whether an attorney may represent both spouses in an uncontested dissolution when any conflict is only potential and both clients provide informed written consent after disclosure.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing dual representation on a categorical basis without assessing actual adversity and the adequacy of consent.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal granted mandate.
- Dual representation of both spouses in a noncontested dissolution is not prohibited per se.
- Joint representation may be permitted when the conflict is only potential, both clients give informed written consent after full disclosure, and the trial court determines the arrangement is appropriate under the circumstances.
- The trial court erred by treating dual representation as categorically impermissible and by failing to evaluate whether the spouses’ interests were actually adverse and whether their consents were informed.
- The superior court was directed to vacate its denial order and reconsider the request under the correct standard.

## Legal Principles

- A lawyer may represent multiple clients with potentially differing interests when there is no actual conflict and each client, after full disclosure of risks and implications, gives informed consent in writing.
- In assessing joint representation, courts should distinguish actual conflict (present, material divergence) from potential conflict (possible future divergence).
- Trial courts have discretion to disallow dual representation in family matters, but must exercise that discretion on a case-specific basis rather than through a per se rule.
- Where the spouses are aligned on dissolution terms and the disputed matter is effectively between the couple and a third party (such as a governmental reimbursement claim), adversity between spouses may be only potential, not actual.

## Conclusion

The Court of Appeal held that an uncontested dissolution may proceed with one attorney representing both spouses if any conflict is merely potential and both spouses provide informed written consent after disclosure; the trial court must evaluate the facts and the validity of consent rather than impose an automatic disqualification rule.


Klemm v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (Ct. App. 1977)