## Facts

- Peter H. Klopfer, a Duke University professor and civil-rights activist, was charged with criminal trespass arising from a sit-in at a segregated restaurant in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
- A grand jury indicted Klopfer in February 1964; he pleaded not guilty.
- The case was tried in March 1964; the jury failed to reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial.
- After continuances, Klopfer sought clarity on when the State would retry him.
- Instead of retrying the case, the prosecutor moved for a “nolle prosequi with leave,” a North Carolina procedure that discharged the defendant from custody but permitted the State to revive the indictment at any time, without further court approval and without effective limitation constraints.
- The trial court granted the motion over Klopfer’s objection and without stated justification, leaving the charge pending indefinitely and subject to reinstatement at the prosecutor’s discretion.
- Klopfer asserted that the unresolved indictment imposed ongoing burdens, including interference with travel and professional activities and the continuing stigma of an unanswered public accusation.

## Issues

1. Whether the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether a state violates the constitutional right to a speedy trial by indefinitely postponing prosecution on an indictment, over the defendant’s objection and without justification, through a procedure allowing unilateral reinstatement at any future time.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and remanded.
- The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is fundamental and enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The Court held that North Carolina denied Klopfer’s constitutional right to a speedy trial by indefinitely postponing prosecution on the indictment over his objection and without stated justification.
- The Court rejected the state court’s view that the speedy-trial right applies only if the State elects to proceed to trial, concluding that indefinite suspension at prosecutorial discretion would nullify the guarantee.
- Concurring in the result, Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed the practice was unconstitutional as applied but preferred to rest the decision on due process rather than broad Sixth Amendment incorporation.

## Legal Principles

- The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause is a fundamental right and applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
- The speedy-trial right protects against both oppressive pretrial restraint and the burdens of unresolved criminal accusations, including anxiety, public stigma, and practical impairment of a defendant’s affairs.
- A State may not, over a defendant’s objection and without justification, keep an indictment pending indefinitely through a mechanism that allows the prosecution to reactivate the case at will.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the Constitution forbids a state procedure that leaves an indictment suspended indefinitely at the prosecution’s discretion, and it applied the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee to state criminal cases through the Fourteenth Amendment.


Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967)