Facts
- Peter H. Klopfer, a Duke University professor and civil-rights activist, was charged with criminal trespass arising from a sit-in at a segregated restaurant in Chapel Hill, North Carolina.
- A grand jury indicted Klopfer in February 1964; he pleaded not guilty.
- The case was tried in March 1964; the jury failed to reach a verdict, and the court declared a mistrial.
- After continuances, Klopfer sought clarity on when the State would retry him.
- Instead of retrying the case, the prosecutor moved for a “nolle prosequi with leave,” a North Carolina procedure that discharged the defendant from custody but permitted the State to revive the indictment at any time, without further court approval and without effective limitation constraints.
- The trial court granted the motion over Klopfer’s objection and without stated justification, leaving the charge pending indefinitely and subject to reinstatement at the prosecutor’s discretion.
- Klopfer asserted that the unresolved indictment imposed ongoing burdens, including interference with travel and professional activities and the continuing stigma of an unanswered public accusation.
Issues
- Whether the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial applies to state criminal prosecutions through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- Whether a state violates the constitutional right to a speedy trial by indefinitely postponing prosecution on an indictment, over the defendant’s objection and without justification, through a procedure allowing unilateral reinstatement at any future time.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina and remanded.
- The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is fundamental and enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The Court held that North Carolina denied Klopfer’s constitutional right to a speedy trial by indefinitely postponing prosecution on the indictment over his objection and without stated justification.
- The Court rejected the state court’s view that the speedy-trial right applies only if the State elects to proceed to trial, concluding that indefinite suspension at prosecutorial discretion would nullify the guarantee.
- Concurring in the result, Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed the practice was unconstitutional as applied but preferred to rest the decision on due process rather than broad Sixth Amendment incorporation.
Legal Principles
- The Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause is a fundamental right and applies to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
- The speedy-trial right protects against both oppressive pretrial restraint and the burdens of unresolved criminal accusations, including anxiety, public stigma, and practical impairment of a defendant’s affairs.
- A State may not, over a defendant’s objection and without justification, keep an indictment pending indefinitely through a mechanism that allows the prosecution to reactivate the case at will.
Conclusion
The Court held that the Constitution forbids a state procedure that leaves an indictment suspended indefinitely at the prosecution’s discretion, and it applied the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial guarantee to state criminal cases through the Fourteenth Amendment.