## Facts

- Rhonda Knealing sued Ernest and Maria Puleo for personal injuries from a May 14, 1990 automobile accident.
- The trial court set the case for trial on July 12, 1993 and ordered mediation.
- Mediation occurred on June 16, 1993 and ended in an impasse.
- On July 1, 1993—15 days after mediation and 11 days before trial—the Puleos served an offer of judgment for $15,001, which Knealing rejected.
- The jury returned a $15,000 verdict for Knealing, later reduced by collateral sources to $5,000.
- The trial court awarded the Puleos attorney’s fees and costs based on the rejected offer, applying § 44.102(6)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993) as permitting a later offer after court-ordered mediation.
- The district court affirmed and certified a question on whether § 44.102(6)’s time requirements unconstitutionally intruded on the Supreme Court’s procedural rulemaking authority.

## Issues

1. Whether the time requirements in § 44.102(6), Fla. Stat. (1993), governing when an offer of judgment may be served after court-ordered mediation, unconstitutionally intrude on the Florida Supreme Court’s exclusive authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure.
2. Whether § 44.102(6)(b) may validly alter the timing provisions for offers of judgment that had been incorporated into Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442.

## Decision

- The Florida Supreme Court answered the certified question “yes,” holding the time requirements in § 44.102(6), Fla. Stat. (1993), unconstitutional.
- The Court quashed the district court’s decision to the extent it relied on § 44.102(6)’s timing provisions to uphold the fee award.
- The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the holding that § 44.102(6)’s timing provisions cannot be applied.

## Legal Principles

- Under Article V, section 2(a) of the Florida Constitution, the Florida Supreme Court has exclusive authority to adopt rules governing court practice and procedure.
- The legislature may create substantive rights (including fee-shifting entitlements), but it may not enact procedural rules that conflict with court-adopted procedural rules.
- Timing and mechanics for serving offers of judgment are procedural; once those procedural components are adopted in a court rule, the legislature cannot alter them by statute.
- A statute that enlarges or modifies the time to serve an offer of judgment in a manner inconsistent with Rule 1.442 is an unconstitutional legislative intrusion into judicial rulemaking.

## Conclusion

The Florida Supreme Court held that § 44.102(6)’s statutory timing provisions for offers of judgment following court-ordered mediation are unconstitutional because they attempt to change procedural requirements already adopted by court rule, requiring reconsideration of fee awards that depended on the statutory timing extension.


Knealing v. Puleo, 675 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996)