## Facts

- Late night in January 1993, Samantha Kneipp and her husband Joseph walked home in Philadelphia after drinking; Samantha was severely intoxicated and sometimes unable to walk without assistance.
- Near their apartment, Officer Wesley Tedder stopped the couple for causing a disturbance on the highway and questioned them separately; additional officers arrived shortly thereafter.
- Viewing the evidence in the plaintiffs’ favor, officers permitted or directed Joseph to go home (to relieve a babysitter) and left Samantha—visibly intoxicated and physically impaired—to proceed home alone.
- Samantha did not reach home; she was later found at the bottom of an embankment after exposure to cold temperatures.
- She suffered hypothermia leading to severe brain damage and permanent impairment.
- Samantha’s guardians sued Officer Tedder, other officers, and the City of Philadelphia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation and municipal liability (including failure to train).

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence, viewed favorably to the plaintiffs, could establish a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation under a state-created danger theory.
2. Whether summary judgment for the City on municipal liability and failure-to-train claims applied the correct legal standard given the alleged constitutional violation.

## Decision

- The Third Circuit held the plaintiffs’ version of events could support a prima facie substantive due process claim because officers allegedly increased the risk of harm that led to Samantha’s injuries.
- The court adopted the state-created danger doctrine as a viable basis for § 1983 liability in the circuit.
- The court agreed no “special relationship” duty applied because Samantha was not in state custody.
- The court vacated summary judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings, including reconsideration of municipal liability claims under the proper standards.

## Legal Principles

- The Due Process Clause generally does not impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from private harm absent recognized exceptions.
- No special-relationship duty arises without custody or comparable restraint of liberty.
- State-created danger liability may exist where state actors, through affirmative use of authority, create or increase danger to an identifiable person.
- The state-created danger framework requires proof that:
  - the harm was foreseeable and fairly direct;
  - the state actor acted with deliberate indifference (or willful disregard) to the plaintiff’s safety;
  - the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim or part of a discrete, identifiable class affected by the state’s acts; and
  - the state actor affirmatively created the danger or made the plaintiff more vulnerable than if the state had not acted.
- Municipal liability under § 1983 requires a showing that a policy, custom, or failure to train (with deliberate indifference) caused the constitutional violation.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit recognized that officers may be liable under § 1983 when they affirmatively separate a vulnerable person from available assistance and thereby increase the risk of serious harm, and it remanded for trial-level proceedings on both the individual-officer claims and the City’s potential municipal liability.


Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199 (3d Cir. 1996)