## Facts

- Robert E. Farringer worked as a USPS rural mail carrier and was required to use his own car for mail delivery rather than a government vehicle.
- While driving to work early one morning, Farringer collided with a vehicle driven by Glenn J. Konradi, killing him.
- The estate alleged Farringer negligently failed to yield the right of way at an intersection.
- The record included evidence that USPS management imposed rules affecting rural carriers’ commute behavior (e.g., discouraging stops or diversions), arguably tying commuting to job requirements.
- The estate sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and also asserted a state-law claim against Farringer.

## Issues

1. Under Indiana respondeat superior law applied through the FTCA, can a reasonable factfinder conclude that a USPS rural carrier was acting within the scope of employment while commuting to work, given mandatory use of a personal vehicle and employer-imposed commute-related controls?
2. If the scope-of-employment evidence permits competing inferences, was summary judgment for the United States improper?

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the United States and remanded.
- The court held there was a genuine issue of material fact on whether Farringer’s commute fell within the scope of employment under Indiana law.
- The court reasoned that Indiana’s general “going-and-coming” rule excluding ordinary commutes is not absolute, and the USPS requirements could place this commute within an exception.
- Because a reasonable jury could find the commute sufficiently connected to and influenced by USPS requirements and control, the case could not be resolved as a matter of law on summary judgment.

## Legal Principles

- Under the FTCA, the scope-of-employment question is governed by the law of the state where the tort occurred (here, Indiana).
- Summary judgment is improper where the record would allow a reasonable jury to find that the employee acted within the scope of employment.
- The “going-and-coming” rule generally treats commuting as outside the scope of employment, but exceptions may apply when the employer’s requirements and control materially connect the commute to the employer’s enterprise.
- Evidence that an employer requires use of a personal vehicle for job duties and regulates aspects of commuting may support treating commuting risks as risks of the employer’s business for vicarious-liability purposes.

## Conclusion

The court held that, on the existing record, a jury could find that USPS job requirements and asserted control over rural carriers’ commuting conduct brought Farringer’s commute within the scope of employment under Indiana law, making FTCA summary judgment for the United States erroneous.


Konradi v. United States, 919 F.2d 1207 (7th Cir. 1990)