## Facts

- Judith Pierce, a Black divorced woman, applied to rent apartment 9J at 225 West 106th Street in Manhattan, managed by Stahl Management.
- Pierce’s application stated she was general counsel to the New York City Commission on Human Rights, earned about $28,000 annually, and included a remark requesting “Painting — New Rulings.”
- Pierce alleged Stahl Management refused to rent to her because of race, sex, and marital status, and noted the apartment was later rented to a white applicant.
- The landlord acknowledged the application led him to believe Pierce “would be a source of trouble” as a tenant and that he preferred a tenant “less informed and more passive.”
- Stahl Management asserted the decision was not based on protected status but on an aversion to renting to a legally sophisticated tenant likely to assert rights.
- To rebut discriminatory motive, Stahl Management presented tenant statistics showing roughly 30% of apartments were rented to Black tenants and about 60% to unmarried tenants.
- The Commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights sought a preliminary injunction under Executive Law § 297(6) to prevent renting the apartment to anyone other than Pierce while the administrative discrimination complaint was pending.
- A temporary restraining order had issued; the court considered whether to continue or vacate interim relief.

## Issues

1. Whether the record showed a sufficient likelihood that Stahl Management refused to rent to Pierce “because of” race, sex, or marital status in violation of Executive Law § 296(5).
2. Whether a preliminary injunction under Executive Law § 297(6) was warranted to preserve the apartment for Pierce pending the agency’s final determination.
3. Whether refusing to rent based on occupation and perceived litigiousness constitutes unlawful housing discrimination when those reasons are not statutory protected categories.

## Decision

- The court denied the application for a preliminary injunction and vacated the temporary restraining order.
- The court found the evidence did not establish a reasonable probability that the administrative complaint would be sustained on the merits.
- The court treated the landlord’s stated reason—aversion to renting to an attorney perceived as a potentially troublesome tenant—as a nonstatutory criterion rather than proof of discrimination based on race, sex, or marital status.
- The court considered the landlord’s statistics (substantial renting to Black and unmarried tenants) as supporting the conclusion that protected traits were unlikely to be the cause of the refusal.

## Legal Principles

- Executive Law § 296(5) prohibits refusal to rent a housing accommodation because of enumerated protected characteristics, including race, sex, and marital status.
- Outside those enumerated categories, a landlord retains broad discretion to select tenants based on reasons not forbidden by statute.
- A landlord’s refusal to rent based on an applicant’s occupation, legal sophistication, or anticipated assertiveness is not, without more, discrimination “because of” a protected trait under the Human Rights Law.
- Temporary injunctive relief under Executive Law § 297(6) requires a showing, on the record, of a sufficient likelihood of success that the complaint will be sustained; absent that showing, interim restraints are not justified.

## Conclusion

The court declined to preserve the apartment for the complainant during the administrative case because the landlord’s admitted motive—avoiding a legally sophisticated tenant viewed as “trouble”—fell outside the Human Rights Law’s protected categories, and the record did not show a sufficient likelihood that the refusal was actually because of race, sex, or marital status.


Kramarsky v. Stahl Mgmt., 92 Misc. 2d 1030, 401 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1977)