## Facts

- Krulewitch and a woman co-defendant were indicted for inducing and transporting a woman from New York to Miami for prostitution and for conspiring to commit those offenses under federal law.
- Krulewitch was tried alone in federal district court and convicted on all counts; the court of appeals affirmed.
- At trial, the government introduced testimony from the complaining witness about an out-of-court statement by the co-defendant made more than six weeks after the Miami trip ended.
- The statement occurred after the complaining witness had returned to New York and after all three individuals had been arrested and were in federal custody.
- The co-defendant allegedly urged the witness not to talk until getting a lawyer and suggested it would be better for the two women to “take the blame” than for Krulewitch.
- Over objection, the statement was admitted against Krulewitch under the coconspirator hearsay theory as a statement made “in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

## Issues

1. Whether a co-defendant’s post-offense, post-arrest statement to a witness was admissible against Krulewitch as a coconspirator statement made during and in furtherance of the charged conspiracy.
2. Whether the statement could be admitted on the theory that conspiracies include an implied, continuing agreement to conceal the completed crime.
3. Whether admitting the statement, if erroneous, was harmless error.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
- The challenged statement was not admissible as made in furtherance of the charged conspiracy to induce and transport the witness for prostitution because that conspiracy had ended before the statement was made.
- The Court rejected admission based on an implied “subsidiary” conspiracy to conceal the crime.
- The error was not harmless because the statement could have affected the verdict.

## Legal Principles

- A coconspirator’s out-of-court statement is admissible against another conspirator only if the statement was made during the course of, and in furtherance of, the conspiracy charged.
- Once the objectives of the charged conspiracy have been achieved or the conspiracy has otherwise terminated, later statements—particularly after arrest—fall outside the coconspirator exception.
- Courts should not infer from the mere existence of a conspiracy an automatic, continuing agreement to conceal the crime for purposes of expanding coconspirator-hearsay admissibility.
- Erroneous admission of inculpatory hearsay is reversible when the record does not show the error was harmless.

## Conclusion

The Court held that a co-defendant’s post-transport, post-arrest statement urging silence and shifting blame could not be admitted against Krulewitch under the coconspirator hearsay theory because it was neither made during nor in furtherance of the charged conspiracy, and the government could not rely on an implied concealment conspiracy to extend the exception.


Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949)