Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978)

Facts

  • Ezra Kulko and Sharon Kulko were New York domiciliaries; they married in California during Kulko’s brief stopover while on military travel.
  • After marriage, both returned to New York, where they lived and had two children.
  • The couple separated in 1972; the mother moved to California.
  • The parties executed a New York separation agreement: the children would live with the father during the school year and visit the mother during specified vacations; the father would pay child support during periods when the children were with the mother.
  • The mother obtained a Haitian divorce incorporating the separation agreement and returned to California.
  • In 1973, the daughter moved to California at her request with the father’s consent and remained there during the school year, visiting her father during vacations.
  • Later, the mother arranged for the son to move to California without the father’s consent by sending him a plane ticket; the son moved to California to live with the mother and sister.

Issues

  1. Whether California could exercise in personam jurisdiction over a New York-domiciled father in an action to modify custody and increase child support when his principal alleged forum contact was consenting to his child’s residence in California.
  2. Whether the children’s presence and resulting effects in California, largely arising from the mother’s and children’s actions, satisfied the Due Process Clause’s “minimum contacts” requirement.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the California Supreme Court, holding (6–3) that California’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the father violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • The father’s consent to his daughter living in California did not constitute purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of California law.
  • The children’s presence in California was primarily attributable to the unilateral actions of the mother and children, which could not supply the father’s minimum contacts.
  • The father’s prior, brief contacts with California (including the marriage-related stopover) were unrelated to the support-modification controversy and did not support jurisdiction.
  • Fairness considerations weighed against forcing a distant, nonresident parent to defend in California based on cooperative parental accommodation.
  • The Court noted that other means existed to address support and enforcement without asserting new personal jurisdiction for modification in California.
  • A state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only when the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum such that litigation there is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
  • Minimum contacts require the defendant’s purposeful conduct creating a substantial connection with the forum; the unilateral activity of another party or third persons cannot establish jurisdiction over the defendant.
  • In domestic relations and child-support disputes, a nonresident parent does not purposefully avail himself of a forum’s laws merely by agreeing that a child may reside with the other parent in the forum state.
  • Foreseeability that a child may reside in the forum is insufficient; due process requires a meaningful relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation grounded in the defendant’s deliberate forum-directed acts.
  • Fairness analysis considers the burden on the defendant and the policy consequences of discouraging cooperative parenting arrangements.

Conclusion

The Court held that California could not assert personal jurisdiction over a New York father in a custody and child-support modification proceeding where his only substantial connection to California was consenting to his child’s move there, because that conduct did not amount to purposeful availment and jurisdiction would be inconsistent with due process.