## Facts

- A voter in the Chiba First District challenged the validity of the 1972 election for Japan’s House of Representatives.
- Seats and district boundaries were set under the Public Offices Election Law using population-based apportionment, but the legislature did not timely revise districting despite later censuses and major population shifts.
- Postwar urbanization increased population in urban prefectures (including Chiba) while many rural areas lost population, producing large disparities in voters-per-representative between districts.
- The plaintiff alleged that the resulting dilution of urban votes violated statutory expectations of periodic adjustment and constitutional guarantees of equality and representative government.
- The lower court rejected the challenge; the case reached the Supreme Court of Japan sitting as the Grand Bench.

## Issues

1. Whether the malapportioned allocation of seats and district boundaries for the 1972 House of Representatives election violated constitutional requirements of equality in the value of votes.
2. If unconstitutional, whether the court should invalidate the 1972 election in the Chiba First District or allow the election results to stand while requiring legislative correction.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court held that equality in the value of votes is constitutionally required and that the existing apportionment had produced disparities beyond permissible legislative discretion.
- The Court characterized the electoral framework as unconstitutional due to the severity of vote-value inequality (reported as exceeding a 4:1 disparity in some comparisons).
- Despite the constitutional violation, the Court declined to invalidate the 1972 election and dismissed the plaintiff’s request for election nullification.
- The Court indicated that responsibility for correcting the unconstitutional condition lay primarily with the legislature, while reserving judicial review authority over extreme disparities.

## Legal Principles

- Constitutional equality and representative-government provisions require “substantial equality” in the value of each vote in legislative elections.
- The legislature has discretion to design electoral districts and may consider nonpopulation factors, but that discretion is limited; extreme vote-value disparities are subject to judicial review and can be unconstitutional.
- Prolonged legislative inaction in the face of significant demographic change can contribute to an unconstitutional electoral condition.
- A court may declare an electoral scheme unconstitutional without annulling an already-conducted election, particularly where institutional stability and reliance interests counsel against retrospective invalidation.

## Conclusion

The Supreme Court recognized a constitutional requirement of substantial vote-value equality and found severe malapportionment unconstitutional, but it denied election-nullification relief and left primary responsibility for correction to the legislature.


Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Commission, 30 Minshū 3 223 (Sup. Ct. Japan 1976)