## Facts

- Kentucky inmates were part of a certified class in prior federal litigation resolved by a consent decree addressing prison conditions.
- After the decree, the Kentucky Department of Corrections issued written visitation “Corrections Policies and Procedures,” listing categories of visitors who *may be excluded*, including persons posing a “clear and probable danger” to institutional security or orderly operation.
- The Kentucky State Reformatory issued a visitation memorandum with virtually identical language, providing that a visitor *may* be refused admission and have visitation privileges suspended under specified circumstances.
- Prison officials denied entry to several visitors and suspended future visits without providing hearings to inmates or visitors.
- The inmate class claimed the visitation rules created a state-law liberty interest in visitation, triggering procedural protections under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

## Issues

1. Whether Kentucky’s prison visitation policies and memoranda created a state-law liberty interest in inmate visitation protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
2. Whether the visitation rules contained sufficiently specific substantive predicates and explicitly mandatory language to limit official discretion and require a particular outcome.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.
- The Court held that the Kentucky visitation regulations did not create a protected liberty interest in receiving visitors.
- Although the regulations included substantive criteria identifying when visitors could be excluded, they lacked explicitly mandatory, outcome-determining language.
- Because no liberty interest was created, the Due Process Clause did not require hearings or other procedures before denying or suspending visitation under this state-created-interest theory.

## Legal Principles

- A state creates a protected liberty interest in the prison context only when its rules (1) contain specific substantive predicates limiting discretion and (2) use explicitly mandatory language requiring a particular result once the predicates are satisfied.
- Permissive terms such as “may” ordinarily preserve administrative discretion and do not establish an enforceable entitlement.
- Guidance-like visitation criteria, without binding mandatory language, do not give inmates an objective expectation of visitation enforceable through due process.

## Conclusion

Kentucky’s visitation rules did not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest because, despite identifying reasons for exclusion, they used discretionary language that did not require officials to allow visitation absent specified conditions; therefore, no procedural due process protections were mandated before visitation was denied or suspended.


Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989)