## Facts

- Beatriz L. Labbee contracted in June 1998 to purchase a Miami condominium from James B. Harrington, a Puerto Rico resident.
- Harrington did not sign the contract personally; realtor Sylvia Bazo signed the contract and related papers under a power of attorney from Harrington and was employed by the listing broker.
- Bazo signed a disclosure stating the roof was three months old and had never leaked since Harrington bought the property in 1973.
- Labbee alleged she relied on the disclosure and later discovered serious roof leakage and structural rot that allegedly existed at the time of contracting.
- Labbee sued for breach of contract and tort claims; the realtor and broker were dismissed, leaving Harrington as the sole defendant.
- After unsuccessful attempts to personally serve Harrington in Puerto Rico, Labbee served (1) Bazo as Harrington’s Florida agent and (2) the Florida Secretary of State by substituted service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 (2003).
- Harrington did not respond; the court entered a default judgment on liability and later a final money judgment for $18,923 (including interest and credit for a settlement).
- Labbee pursued collection by garnishing a Florida bank account; Harrington then appeared specially and moved to vacate for lack of personal jurisdiction and invalid service, and sought dissolution of garnishment and sanctions.
- The trial court vacated the judgment, dissolved the garnishment, and imposed sanctions, reasoning the complaint did not plead the statutory language or ultimate jurisdictional facts required to invoke § 48.181.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged jurisdictional facts to invoke substituted service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181 (2003) and support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident seller.
2. Whether, based on service and jurisdiction, the trial court properly vacated the default judgment, dissolved the garnishment, and awarded sanctions.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the order vacating the default judgment.
- It held substituted service under § 48.181 was valid because the pleadings and record sufficiently alleged ultimate facts showing Harrington carried on a business or business venture in Florida related to the transaction.
- The court reinstated the judgment and concluded the garnishment dissolution and sanctions—premised on invalid service and lack of jurisdiction—were error.

## Legal Principles

- To use substituted service under Fla. Stat. § 48.181, a plaintiff must plead jurisdictional facts showing the defendant is a nonresident (or conceals whereabouts) and is carrying on a business or business venture in Florida connected to the cause of action.
- A complaint need not quote § 48.181 verbatim; alleging ultimate facts that bring the defendant within the statute can suffice.
- Long-term ownership and rental-related use of Florida property, and conducting a Florida real-estate sale through Florida agents, can constitute a Florida business venture for § 48.181 purposes when the claim arises from that activity.
- A default judgment should not be set aside on the theory of defective service where substituted service is authorized and properly supported by pleaded jurisdictional facts; ancillary orders based on the same defect (e.g., dissolving garnishment and imposing sanctions) fall with that premise.

## Conclusion

The appellate court held that substituted service on the Secretary of State was properly invoked because the complaint alleged ultimate facts establishing the nonresident defendant’s Florida business activity tied to the sale, requiring reversal of the order vacating the default judgment and related relief.


Labbee v. Harrington, 913 So. 2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)