## Facts

- Minerva Lachira, a Hispanic tenant, rented an apartment in Connecticut where she lived with her minor son.
- The property was owned by Stanford Sutton and managed by James Sutton, who interacted with Lachira regarding tenancy matters.
- Lachira alleged James Sutton made discriminatory remarks, including that it was “a mistake to rent to you with a child” and referring to her and her son as “stupid Spanish people.”
- Lachira claimed defendants’ conduct relating to the tenancy (including dealings over conditions, repairs, and access) was intended to force her out because of her Hispanic origin and familial status.
- Lachira sued under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and asserted a supplemental Connecticut claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- In opposing summary judgment, Lachira submitted an affidavit and exhibits; defendants moved to strike parts of those submissions as noncompliant with Rule 56(e).

## Issues

1. Whether portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and exhibits should be struck under Rule 56(e) as lacking personal knowledge, containing inadmissible hearsay, being conclusory, or contradicting prior deposition testimony.
2. Whether the admissible summary-judgment record created a genuine dispute of material fact on FHA discrimination based on national origin and familial status.
3. Whether the admissible record was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Connecticut IIED, including “extreme and outrageous” conduct and severe distress.

## Decision

- The court granted defendants’ motion to strike in part and denied it in part.
- The court struck affidavit statements and exhibits that were not based on personal knowledge, contained hearsay or lacked proper support, were conclusory/argumentative, or contradicted prior sworn deposition testimony without adequate explanation.
- The court considered the remaining admissible portions of plaintiff’s submissions, including testimony describing events she personally observed and alleged statements by James Sutton.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, concluding the remaining admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on the FHA or IIED claims.

## Legal Principles

- On summary judgment, the nonmovant may not rely on pleadings alone and must present specific admissible facts showing a genuine issue for trial.
- Rule 56(e) requires affidavits to be based on personal knowledge, set out admissible facts, and show the affiant’s competence to testify.
- Courts may strike or disregard evidence that is hearsay, unauthenticated, speculative, conclusory, or otherwise inadmissible.
- Under the “sham affidavit” doctrine, a party cannot create a triable issue by submitting an affidavit that materially contradicts prior deposition testimony without adequate explanation.
- FHA discrimination claims may be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; offensive remarks, without sufficient admissible facts tying challenged housing conduct to discriminatory motive, may be inadequate to defeat summary judgment.
- Connecticut IIED requires proof of intent (or foreseeability), extreme and outrageous conduct, causation, and severe emotional distress; the “extreme and outrageous” element is demanding.

## Conclusion

The court narrowed the summary-judgment record by striking improper affidavit material and exhibits under Rule 56(e) and then entered judgment for defendants because the remaining admissible evidence was too thin to support a reasonable finding of FHA discrimination or Connecticut intentional infliction of emotional distress.


Lachira v. Sutton, No. 3:05-cv-1585 (PCD), 2007 WL 1346913 (D. Conn. May 7, 2007)