Facts
- Minerva Lachira, a Hispanic tenant, rented an apartment in Connecticut where she lived with her minor son.
- The property was owned by Stanford Sutton and managed by James Sutton, who interacted with Lachira regarding tenancy matters.
- Lachira alleged James Sutton made discriminatory remarks, including that it was “a mistake to rent to you with a child” and referring to her and her son as “stupid Spanish people.”
- Lachira claimed defendants’ conduct relating to the tenancy (including dealings over conditions, repairs, and access) was intended to force her out because of her Hispanic origin and familial status.
- Lachira sued under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and asserted a supplemental Connecticut claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- In opposing summary judgment, Lachira submitted an affidavit and exhibits; defendants moved to strike parts of those submissions as noncompliant with Rule 56(e).
Issues
- Whether portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and exhibits should be struck under Rule 56(e) as lacking personal knowledge, containing inadmissible hearsay, being conclusory, or contradicting prior deposition testimony.
- Whether the admissible summary-judgment record created a genuine dispute of material fact on FHA discrimination based on national origin and familial status.
- Whether the admissible record was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Connecticut IIED, including “extreme and outrageous” conduct and severe distress.
Decision
- The court granted defendants’ motion to strike in part and denied it in part.
- The court struck affidavit statements and exhibits that were not based on personal knowledge, contained hearsay or lacked proper support, were conclusory/argumentative, or contradicted prior sworn deposition testimony without adequate explanation.
- The court considered the remaining admissible portions of plaintiff’s submissions, including testimony describing events she personally observed and alleged statements by James Sutton.
- The court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims, concluding the remaining admissible evidence did not raise a genuine issue of material fact on the FHA or IIED claims.
Legal Principles
- On summary judgment, the nonmovant may not rely on pleadings alone and must present specific admissible facts showing a genuine issue for trial.
- Rule 56(e) requires affidavits to be based on personal knowledge, set out admissible facts, and show the affiant’s competence to testify.
- Courts may strike or disregard evidence that is hearsay, unauthenticated, speculative, conclusory, or otherwise inadmissible.
- Under the “sham affidavit” doctrine, a party cannot create a triable issue by submitting an affidavit that materially contradicts prior deposition testimony without adequate explanation.
- FHA discrimination claims may be evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework; offensive remarks, without sufficient admissible facts tying challenged housing conduct to discriminatory motive, may be inadequate to defeat summary judgment.
- Connecticut IIED requires proof of intent (or foreseeability), extreme and outrageous conduct, causation, and severe emotional distress; the “extreme and outrageous” element is demanding.
Conclusion
The court narrowed the summary-judgment record by striking improper affidavit material and exhibits under Rule 56(e) and then entered judgment for defendants because the remaining admissible evidence was too thin to support a reasonable finding of FHA discrimination or Connecticut intentional infliction of emotional distress.