## Facts

- Harold G. Lacks (husband) and Irene R. Lacks (wife) were former spouses involved in prolonged matrimonial litigation.
- In August 1965, the husband commenced an action in New York Supreme Court seeking separation; the case later proceeded under newly liberalized divorce laws.
- After extensive litigation, including two trials and an appeal, the Supreme Court entered a final judgment of divorce in 1970.
- The Appellate Division affirmed the divorce judgment in 1972, and further appellate review was denied.
- In 1975, the wife moved under CPLR 5015(a)(4) to vacate the 1970 divorce judgment, arguing the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the husband allegedly failed to satisfy Domestic Relations Law § 230’s durational residency requirement.
- Special Term granted the motion and set aside the divorce judgment.
- The Appellate Division modified by denying vacatur and reinstating the divorce judgment.
- The wife appealed as of right to the New York Court of Appeals.

## Issues

1. Whether noncompliance with Domestic Relations Law § 230’s durational residency requirement deprives the New York Supreme Court of subject matter jurisdiction in a divorce action.
2. Whether a final divorce judgment allegedly entered without satisfaction of § 230 is “void” and therefore must be vacated under CPLR 5015(a)(4).

## Decision

- The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order denying vacatur and reinstating the divorce judgment.
- The court held that Domestic Relations Law § 230’s residency requirements concern the substantive sufficiency of the divorce claim, not the Supreme Court’s competence to adjudicate divorce actions.
- Even if § 230 was not satisfied, the resulting judgment would be, at most, legally or factually erroneous rather than void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
- CPLR 5015(a)(4) could not be used years later to reopen the case by recasting an alleged merits error as a jurisdictional defect.
- The court noted separately that recognition in other states depends on federal constitutional minimum contacts, a distinct inquiry from New York’s allocation of subject matter jurisdiction.

## Legal Principles

- In a court of general jurisdiction, “subject matter jurisdiction” concerns the court’s competence to hear a category of cases; it is not defeated by failure to prove a statutory element of a claim.
- Statutory prerequisites labeled “jurisdictional” may still function as elements of the cause of action; misapplication of such prerequisites does not render the judgment void.
- Domestic Relations Law § 230’s durational residency connections are elements required to obtain divorce relief, but they do not withdraw divorce actions from the Supreme Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
- A judgment is not void under CPLR 5015(a)(4) unless the court lacked fundamental authority over the class of cases; errors within the court’s competence are addressed through direct review, not collateral attack.
- Finality limits post-judgment challenges: issues that were, or could have been, litigated in the original action generally cannot be reopened through a late jurisdictional characterization.

## Conclusion

The New York Court of Appeals held that failure to satisfy the divorce residency requirement in Domestic Relations Law § 230 does not negate the Supreme Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, so a final divorce judgment is not void and cannot be vacated under CPLR 5015(a)(4) on that ground.


Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 359 N.E.2d 384 (N.Y. 1976)