## Facts

- Anthony Cooper was charged in Michigan with assault with intent to murder and related offenses after shooting a woman multiple times.
- The prosecution offered a plea agreement: dismissal of two charges and a recommended sentence of 51–85 months on the remaining charges in exchange for a guilty plea.
- Cooper admitted guilt and indicated willingness to accept the plea.
- Cooper rejected the offer based on counsel’s incorrect advice that the prosecution could not prove intent to murder because the victim was shot “below the waist.”
- Cooper went to trial, was convicted on all counts, and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185–360 months, substantially higher than the plea offer.
- In state postconviction proceedings, Cooper claimed ineffective assistance based on counsel’s plea advice; state courts denied relief on the ground that he knowingly chose trial.
- On federal habeas review, the district court granted conditional relief and ordered relief tied to the original plea; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address how *Strickland* prejudice applies when ineffective assistance causes rejection of a plea followed by conviction at trial.

## Issues

1. Whether a defendant can show *Strickland* prejudice when deficient plea advice leads to rejection of a plea offer and the defendant is later convicted after a fair trial.
2. What a defendant must prove to establish prejudice in that setting.
3. What remedy is appropriate when prejudice is shown from the loss of a favorable plea disposition.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded.
- The Court held that a fair trial does not categorically bar an ineffective-assistance claim arising from plea bargaining.
- To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that:
  - the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it;
  - the trial court would have accepted the plea’s terms; and
  - the conviction, sentence, or both under the plea would have been less severe than the post-trial judgment imposed.
- The Court rejected automatic “specific performance” of the lost plea as a mandatory remedy in all cases.
- The remedy must be tailored to neutralize the constitutional violation without granting an improper windfall; one common approach is to require the State to re-offer the plea and permit the trial court to exercise discretion as to vacatur and resentencing.

## Legal Principles

- The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to plea negotiations as a critical stage of the prosecution.
- *Strickland* prejudice in the plea-rejection context focuses on whether the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice, not solely on the fairness of the ensuing trial.
- A defendant who proves that deficient plea advice caused loss of a more favorable plea outcome can establish prejudice even if the later trial was constitutionally fair.
- Remedies for ineffective assistance during plea bargaining are equitable and case-specific: courts should neutralize the harm caused by the violation while respecting prosecutorial discretion and avoiding windfalls.

## Conclusion

The Court recognized that ineffective assistance during plea bargaining can cause constitutional prejudice when it leads a defendant to reject a favorable plea and receive a harsher outcome after trial, and it required a rigorous, fact-based showing of likely plea acceptance, court approval, and a less severe disposition, with relief calibrated to the circumstances rather than automatic enforcement of the original offer.


Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012)