Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012)

Facts

  • Anthony Cooper was charged in Michigan with assault with intent to murder and related offenses after shooting a woman multiple times.
  • The prosecution offered a plea agreement: dismissal of two charges and a recommended sentence of 51–85 months on the remaining charges in exchange for a guilty plea.
  • Cooper admitted guilt and indicated willingness to accept the plea.
  • Cooper rejected the offer based on counsel’s incorrect advice that the prosecution could not prove intent to murder because the victim was shot “below the waist.”
  • Cooper went to trial, was convicted on all counts, and received a mandatory minimum sentence of 185–360 months, substantially higher than the plea offer.
  • In state postconviction proceedings, Cooper claimed ineffective assistance based on counsel’s plea advice; state courts denied relief on the ground that he knowingly chose trial.
  • On federal habeas review, the district court granted conditional relief and ordered relief tied to the original plea; the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
  • The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address how Strickland prejudice applies when ineffective assistance causes rejection of a plea followed by conviction at trial.

Issues

  1. Whether a defendant can show Strickland prejudice when deficient plea advice leads to rejection of a plea offer and the defendant is later convicted after a fair trial.
  2. What a defendant must prove to establish prejudice in that setting.
  3. What remedy is appropriate when prejudice is shown from the loss of a favorable plea disposition.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded.

  • The Court held that a fair trial does not categorically bar an ineffective-assistance claim arising from plea bargaining.

  • To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that:

    • the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it;
    • the trial court would have accepted the plea’s terms; and
    • the conviction, sentence, or both under the plea would have been less severe than the post-trial judgment imposed.
  • The Court rejected automatic “specific performance” of the lost plea as a mandatory remedy in all cases.

  • The remedy must be tailored to neutralize the constitutional violation without granting an improper windfall; one common approach is to require the State to re-offer the plea and permit the trial court to exercise discretion as to vacatur and resentencing.

  • The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to plea negotiations as a critical stage of the prosecution.
  • Strickland prejudice in the plea-rejection context focuses on whether the outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice, not solely on the fairness of the ensuing trial.
  • A defendant who proves that deficient plea advice caused loss of a more favorable plea outcome can establish prejudice even if the later trial was constitutionally fair.
  • Remedies for ineffective assistance during plea bargaining are equitable and case-specific: courts should neutralize the harm caused by the violation while respecting prosecutorial discretion and avoiding windfalls.

Conclusion

The Court recognized that ineffective assistance during plea bargaining can cause constitutional prejudice when it leads a defendant to reject a favorable plea and receive a harsher outcome after trial, and it required a rigorous, fact-based showing of likely plea acceptance, court approval, and a less severe disposition, with relief calibrated to the circumstances rather than automatic enforcement of the original offer.