## Facts

- Richard Lambertson, an Armour & Co. employee, was unloading a beef shipment at a Syracuse, New York meat-packing plant.
- William Boslet, a USDA meat inspector assigned to the plant, approached Lambertson during work and engaged in “horseplay.”
- Boslet yelled “boo,” pulled Lambertson’s stocking hat over his eyes, and jumped onto Lambertson’s back in a piggyback-like manner.
- Lambertson fell forward and struck his face on nearby meat hooks, suffering serious mouth and dental injuries.
- Witnesses described the incident as one-sided horseplay and agreed Boslet did not intend to injure Lambertson; Boslet apologized immediately.
- Boslet was on duty at the time of the incident.
- Lambertson sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging the conduct was negligent because injury was not intended.
- The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception for claims arising out of assault or battery applied.

## Issues

1. Whether an FTCA claim for injuries caused by a federal employee’s intentional physical “horseplay,” undertaken without intent to injure, is a claim “arising out of” battery barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
2. Whether a plaintiff may avoid § 2680(h) by pleading negligence when the underlying conduct constitutes battery under applicable state law.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
- The court held Boslet’s conduct constituted battery under New York law because it involved intentional, offensive bodily contact, even without intent to cause harm.
- Because the FTCA excludes any claim “arising out of” assault or battery, § 2680(h) barred the action against the United States.
- The court rejected recharacterizing the claim as negligence where the injury stemmed from conduct that, in substance, was an excluded intentional tort.
- Any scope-of-employment questions were not dispositive given the jurisdictional bar under § 2680(h).

## Legal Principles

- The FTCA waives sovereign immunity only to the extent Congress permits; statutory exceptions, including § 2680(h), limit federal jurisdiction.
- For § 2680(h), courts look to the substance of the conduct and the state-law characterization of the tort, not the plaintiff’s pleading label.
- Under New York law, battery may be established by intentional bodily contact that is offensive; intent to injure is not required.
- An FTCA claim is barred when it “arises out of” an assault or battery, even if the plaintiff frames the case as negligence to describe unintended consequences.

## Conclusion

The court held that injuries caused by a federal employee’s intentional horseplay involved a battery under New York law, so the FTCA’s intentional-tort exception in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) deprived the federal courts of jurisdiction over the claim against the United States.


Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1976)