## Facts

- Jerry Falwell and his ministry used the website www.falwell.com and claimed trademark rights in “Jerry Falwell” and “Falwell,” plus a registered mark for a Falwell-related program.
- After hearing Falwell’s remarks about homosexuality, Christopher Lamparello registered the domain www.fallwell.com and created a website criticizing Falwell’s views and biblical interpretation.
- The site contained prominent critical statements about Falwell and his positions and included content that was plainly oppositional rather than supportive.
- The homepage prominently disclaimed any affiliation with Falwell or his ministry and provided a hyperlink to Falwell’s official website.
- Lamparello did not sell goods or services through the site; the parties agreed the site had no measurable impact on traffic to Falwell’s website.
- Falwell sent cease-and-desist letters demanding Lamparello stop using domains incorporating Falwell’s name.
- Lamparello sought a declaratory judgment of noninfringement; Falwell counterclaimed for Lanham Act infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and ACPA cybersquatting.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Falwell, enjoined Lamparello’s use of the domain, and ordered transfer of the domain to Falwell, while denying damages and attorney’s fees.

## Issues

1. Whether use of www.fallwell.com for a critical website created a likelihood of confusion as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation under the Lanham Act and related unfair competition theories.
2. Whether Lamparello’s registration and use of www.fallwell.com constituted cybersquatting under the ACPA by showing a bad faith intent to profit from Falwell’s marks.
3. Whether “initial interest confusion” could support liability where the website was noncommercial and clearly critical.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit reversed the summary judgment for Falwell and remanded for entry of judgment in Lamparello’s favor.
- The court held there was no likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation because the website’s content, disclaimer, and link to Falwell’s site made non-affiliation apparent.
- The court held Lamparello did not violate the ACPA because the evidence did not show a bad faith intent to profit from Falwell’s marks.
- The court rejected application of initial interest confusion on these facts, particularly given the absence of commercial exploitation.

## Legal Principles

- Lanham Act liability for infringement and false designation turns on a likelihood of confusion about source, sponsorship, or affiliation, evaluated in the overall context in which consumers encounter the challenged use.
- A domain name’s similarity to a mark does not, by itself, establish likely confusion when the associated website quickly and clearly signals criticism and non-affiliation, including through prominent disclaimers and content.
- Initial interest confusion is chiefly associated with commercial diversion that trades on a mark to draw consumers toward competing goods or services; it is disfavored where the use is noncommercial commentary.
- ACPA cybersquatting requires proof of bad faith intent to profit; noncommercial, single-target use of a domain to express disagreement, without attempts to sell the domain or otherwise monetize the mark, does not satisfy this element.
- Trademark statutes should be construed so they do not suppress noncommercial criticism and commentary protected by the First Amendment when statutory elements (confusion and bad faith intent to profit) are not met.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit held that a noncommercial “gripe site” using a domain name similar to a public figure’s mark, where the site clearly disclaimed affiliation and communicated criticism, did not create a likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act and did not constitute ACPA cybersquatting absent bad faith intent to profit.


Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005)