Introduction
Contract law necessitates the presence of valid consideration for an agreement to be legally binding. Consideration, in its most basic form, constitutes something of value exchanged between parties. Typically, this is a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. A fundamental tenet of contract law is that past consideration is not good consideration. This principle stipulates that an action completed before a promise is made cannot be used to support that later promise. However, there are established exceptions to this rule, one of which is illustrated in the seminal case of Lampleigh v Braithwait (1615) Hob 105. This judgment clarifies that where a prior request is made, followed by a promise of payment, the promise can be connected to the earlier request, thereby constituting valid consideration. The judgment provides the legal rationale for past consideration being valid when an earlier request implies an understanding of future remuneration.
The Facts of Lampleigh v Braithwait
The Lampleigh v Braithwait case arose from a rather unusual sequence of events. The defendant, Braithwait, committed a serious crime, specifically, the act of killing an individual. Following this act, Braithwait requested that the plaintiff, Lampleigh, secure a pardon from the King. Lampleigh, responding to Braithwait’s request, undertook considerable effort and expense. He travelled across the country, at his own cost, to obtain the requested pardon. After Lampleigh successfully secured the pardon and presented it to Braithwait, Braithwait promised to pay Lampleigh £100 for his troubles. Braithwait subsequently reneged on his promise, and refused to provide the agreed payment. This led to Lampleigh initiating legal proceedings to recover the promised sum. The key issue before the court was whether the work performed by Lampleigh prior to Braithwait's promise could be considered valid consideration, despite being a past act.
Past Consideration and the General Rule
The general principle of contract law dictates that past consideration is not good consideration. This means that if an action has been completed prior to a promise being made, that action cannot be cited as consideration to support the promise. This is because the action was not carried out in exchange for the promise; it was completed independently of it. For example, in Re McArdle (1951), the court determined that decorating work completed before a promise to pay for it was made constituted past consideration. The promise was therefore unenforceable, as the consideration was deemed past. This demonstrates that for consideration to be valid, it must be provided contemporaneously with, or after, the promise, forming part of the exchange. The general rule against past consideration prevents individuals from being bound to promises that relate to prior, unconnected acts.
The Exception Established in Lampleigh v Braithwait
The court’s decision in Lampleigh v Braithwait established an exception to the rule of past consideration. Specifically, where an act is performed at the promisor’s request and there is an understanding that the act is to be remunerated, the subsequent promise to pay can be linked to the original request. This implies that the act was not entirely past consideration. This represents an exception to the general principle against past consideration. In this case, although Lampleigh had secured the pardon before Braithwait promised payment, the court determined that Braithwait's initial request carried an implied promise of remuneration. The act of obtaining the pardon was not seen as a voluntary act, but one that was completed upon request with the clear understanding that payment would occur. The subsequent promise to pay, therefore, merely fixed the exact sum.
Rationale and Implications of the Decision
The court’s rationale was that Braithwait’s original request to Lampleigh created an implied understanding of payment. This allowed the court to connect the later promise of £100 to the initial request. The later promise was therefore not seen as a new separate promise, but the fixing of the already implied promise. This legal principle can be seen in similar cases. For instance, the ruling in Re Casey’s Patents (1892) demonstrates the same principle. In Re Casey's Patents, work was carried out by a manager on a patent which was then followed by a promise of a share in the patent. Although the work had been done prior to the explicit promise, the court ruled that as there was an implied understanding of payment due to the business setting and the request for the work, the later promise to pay was enforceable. These cases help clarify the limits of the general rule against past consideration.
Subsequent Legal Developments
The principles established in Lampleigh v Braithwait have been repeatedly affirmed and refined in subsequent case law. One notable case is Pao On v Lau Yiu Long (1980), where Lord Scarman, speaking for the Privy Council, articulated the requirements for an act performed before a promise to be considered good consideration. These requirements are: (1) the act must have been done at the promisor’s request; (2) there must have been an understanding between the parties that the act was to be remunerated, either by a payment or by the conferment of some other benefit; and (3) the payment or benefit would have been legally enforceable had it been promised in advance. These conditions serve as a modern clarification and restatement of the principle established in Lampleigh v Braithwait. The ruling in Pao On confirms the legal viability of consideration that was initially performed before the promise but within the context of an implied agreement for payment.
Distinguishing From Other Consideration Cases
The Lampleigh v Braithwait decision can be more easily understood by contrasting it with other consideration cases. For example, in Price v Easton (1833), it was determined that a party who had not provided consideration to a contract could not sue on it. In this case, the plaintiff attempted to enforce a contract between two other parties, but since he did not provide any consideration, the claim failed. Another case, Collins v Godefroy (1831), established that performing a legal duty cannot constitute good consideration. Collins, who was legally obligated to attend court, could not cite this duty as valid consideration for a promise of payment for attending court. In contrast, Glassbrooke v GCC (1925) demonstrated that an act exceeding public duty could constitute consideration. Here, additional police protection, provided beyond normal duties, was considered valid consideration for a promise of payment. These distinctions help illustrate how Lampleigh v Braithwait forms part of the overall structure of consideration principles in contract law. The key is whether or not the act was performed at the request of the promisor and with an understanding of payment.
The Relationship Between Existing Duty and Consideration
Cases such as Stilk v Myrick (1809) and Hartley v Ponsonby (1857) further refine the rules regarding performance of existing contractual duties and consideration. In Stilk v Myrick, the court held that a promise of extra pay to sailors for completing a voyage, when some crew had deserted, was not supported by consideration as they were simply carrying out their existing contractual duty. However, in Hartley v Ponsonby, the court found that sailing a ship back in dangerous conditions with a severely undermanned crew constituted consideration as the circumstances had gone beyond the terms of the existing contract. Williams v Roffey (1990) introduced the concept of practical benefit to existing contractual duty. Where the promisor gains a practical benefit from the promisee’s continued performance, this can be consideration. The case of Scotson v Pegg (1861) further demonstrates the acceptance of existing duty to a third party as consideration, where performance of this duty was deemed a benefit to the new promisor. These cases illustrate that while performance of a pre-existing duty is typically not good consideration, there are exceptions, and Lampleigh v Braithwait’s consideration requirements are in line with this development of the law.
Conclusion
The Lampleigh v Braithwait judgment presents an important exception to the general rule that past consideration is not valid consideration. The case demonstrates that actions undertaken at the promisor's request, with an implied understanding of payment, can form valid consideration for a later promise of payment. The ruling has influenced subsequent decisions in contract law, exemplified by cases such as Re Casey’s Patents and Pao On v Lau Yiu Long. These decisions clarify that the crucial factor is whether the act was done in response to a request and whether an understanding of remuneration existed. The principles established in Lampleigh v Braithwait continue to play a significant role in determining the enforceability of contracts, particularly when dealing with situations involving prior performance and subsequent promises. This judgment serves as a benchmark for assessing when past actions can be coupled with subsequent promises to create legally binding agreements. This area of law also overlaps with the pre-existing duty rule in cases like Stilk v Myrick which further refines the complexity of consideration.
