## Facts

- Barbara Landgraf worked at USI Film Products’ plant in Tyler, Texas, operating a plastic-bag machine on the overnight shift.
- A coworker repeatedly harassed Landgraf with inappropriate remarks and physical contact.
- After Landgraf reported the conduct to management, the employer investigated, reprimanded the coworker, and transferred him.
- Landgraf resigned four days after the transfer.
- The EEOC found likely hostile-environment harassment but concluded the employer adequately remedied the violation and issued a right-to-sue letter.
- Landgraf sued under Title VII in 1989; after a bench trial, the district court found a hostile work environment and mental anguish but no constructive discharge.
- Because pre-1991 Title VII did not authorize compensatory or punitive damages for this claim and no equitable relief was awarded, the district court dismissed the complaint.
- While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, including § 102, which authorizes compensatory and punitive damages for intentional discrimination and permits a jury trial when such damages are sought.
- Landgraf sought remand to pursue § 102 damages and a jury trial; the Fifth Circuit rejected the request and affirmed.

## Issues

1. Whether Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (compensatory and punitive damages and a jury trial) applies to Title VII cases pending on appeal when the Act was enacted, where the underlying conduct occurred before enactment.
2. Whether, absent a clear congressional directive, courts should construe § 102 to attach new legal consequences to pre-enactment conduct.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit.
- The Court held that § 102 does not apply to a Title VII case pending on appeal when the 1991 Act was enacted if the relevant conduct occurred before enactment.
- The Court concluded Congress did not clearly state that § 102 applies retroactively.
- Because § 102 creates new damages remedies (and a related jury-trial mechanism) that alter the legal consequences of past conduct, the presumption against retroactivity controlled.

## Legal Principles

- Statutes and administrative rules are not construed to have retroactive effect unless Congress clearly requires that result.
- A law is retroactive in the relevant sense when it attaches new legal consequences to events completed before enactment, particularly by changing substantive rights, liabilities, or duties based on past conduct.
- Changes commonly applied to pending cases include many rules that are purely jurisdictional or procedural and do not alter the parties’ substantive obligations for past conduct.
- Provisions authorizing compensatory and punitive damages for past conduct are substantive for retroactivity purposes; retroactive punitive damages raise serious constitutional concerns, reinforcing the need for a clear statement.
- Effective-date clauses stating that an Act “shall take effect upon enactment,” without more, do not necessarily resolve whether new remedies apply to pre-enactment conduct or pending cases.

## Conclusion

The Court held that § 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could not be applied to Landgraf’s pending Title VII appeal because Congress did not clearly mandate retroactive application and § 102 would impose new substantive consequences—compensatory and punitive damages and a related jury-trial right—on conduct that occurred before enactment.


Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)