## Facts

- A North Carolina court adjudicated Abby Gail Lassiter’s infant son a neglected child and placed him in the custody of the county Department of Social Services (DSS).
- Lassiter was later convicted of second-degree murder of another child and sentenced to a lengthy prison term.
- DSS petitioned to terminate Lassiter’s parental rights to the infant; she was transported from prison to the termination hearing.
- The trial court, on its own initiative, found Lassiter had ample opportunity to obtain counsel and declined to continue the hearing; she did not claim indigency or request appointed counsel.
- Lassiter cross-examined a DSS social worker, and she and her mother testified in response to the judge’s questions.
- The court terminated Lassiter’s parental rights, finding she had not contacted DSS about the child for a long period and had willfully failed to show concern or responsibility for the child’s welfare.

## Issues

1. Whether the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause requires appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every proceeding to terminate parental rights.
2. Whether, on these facts, due process required the trial court to appoint counsel for Lassiter.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed.
- The Court rejected a categorical constitutional rule requiring appointed counsel in all parental-rights termination proceedings.
- The Court held that whether due process requires counsel must be decided case by case by the trial court, subject to appellate review.
- The Court concluded that the failure to appoint counsel in Lassiter’s proceeding did not violate due process.

## Legal Principles

- There is a presumption that an indigent litigant is entitled to appointed counsel only when an adverse result may deprive the litigant of physical liberty.
- In civil cases, due process entitlement to appointed counsel is determined by balancing the Mathews v. Eldridge factors: (1) the private interest at stake, (2) the government’s interests, and (3) the risk of error under existing procedures and the likely value of counsel.
- In parental-rights termination proceedings, the parent’s interest is weighty, but it does not create an automatic constitutional right to counsel; the Mathews balance may still require counsel in particular cases depending on complexity and the parent’s ability to proceed without representation.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the Constitution does not mandate appointed counsel for indigent parents in every termination-of-parental-rights case; instead, courts apply a presumption tied to loss of physical liberty and then assess, under Mathews balancing, whether due process requires counsel in the specific proceeding.


Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)