## Facts

- Daniel Latino and Robert Slawinski were arrested on June 2, 1991, outside Chicago Stadium during the NBA Finals.
- Officer Edward Kaizer and another officer arrested them for alleged ticket scalping under a Chicago municipal ordinance.
- Latino and Slawinski were charged with “ticket speculation” and given a court date; the matter was later continued.
- Officer Kaizer appeared at the first court date but did not appear at the continued date; the ticket-speculation charge was dismissed when no officer testified.
- Latino and Slawinski sued Kaizer, another officer, and the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleged arrest without probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) and under Illinois common-law false imprisonment.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 by vacating the first jury’s defense verdict based on the judge’s view that officers testified falsely and by ordering a new trial.
2. Whether the first jury’s defense verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence where liability turned on conflicting testimony and credibility determinations.

## Decision

- The Seventh Circuit reversed the order granting a new trial.
- The court held the district judge abused discretion by setting aside the first jury verdict on the basis of the judge’s own credibility determinations and characterization of testimony as “perjury.”
- The court reinstated the first jury’s verdict in favor of Officer Kaizer and the City of Chicago.
- Because the first verdict was reinstated, the second-trial damages judgment and the related attorney’s-fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 were eliminated.

## Legal Principles

- A Rule 59 new trial on “weight of the evidence” grounds is proper only when the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, not merely because the judge would have decided differently.
- Credibility determinations are principally for the jury; a trial judge may not vacate a verdict by substituting the judge’s view of witness credibility for the jury’s resolution of conflicting testimony.
- A judge’s belief that trial testimony was false, without a basis that meets Rule 59’s narrow standard, does not justify discarding testimony the jury was entitled to credit when the record contains evidence supporting the verdict.
- When the prevailing party’s evidence, if believed, supports the verdict, appellate review gives substantial protection to the jury’s role, and Rule 59 discretion is constrained.

## Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit held that the district court exceeded its limited Rule 59 authority by overturning a defense verdict based on the judge’s rejection of the officers’ credibility in a fact-bound probable-cause dispute, and it reinstated the original verdict for Officer Kaizer and the City.


Latino v. Kaizer, 58 F.3d 310 (7th Cir. 1995)