## Facts

- A subdivision was approved in 1959 in Sachem’s Head, Guilford, Connecticut, consisting of six lots north of Falcon Road and a small shore area known as the “Second Piece” south of Falcon Road; an additional nearby 2.23-acre parcel included a small beach.
- The Sperry estate conveyed the six lots, Walden Hill Road, and the Second Piece to Falcon, Inc., granting Falcon and its successors “the right to use the beach located easterly of the second piece . . . for the purpose of bathing only.”
- Falcon conveyed the six lots to individual owners using deed language granting, “together with” each lot, the right to use the beach “in common with others, for the purpose of bathing only,” and a right-of-way over Walden Hill Road.
- The plaintiffs were successors in title to the lot owners and claimed the benefit of the beach easement.
- In 1975, the defendant purchased the 2.23-acre parcel containing the beach; his deed stated the property was “subject to rights of others of use, as of record.”
- The defendant opened the beach—about 1,300 square feet—to the general public, resulting in use by thousands of people.
- The plaintiffs sued to quiet title to their easement and to enjoin public opening of the beach, alleging material interference with their ability to use the beach for bathing.

## Issues

1. Whether the deed language created an easement appurtenant benefitting the six lots, rather than a personal right in gross.
2. Whether opening a small beach to extensive public use materially and unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs’ deeded right to use the beach for bathing.
3. Whether general public-policy favoring beach access alters or limits recorded private easement rights between the parties.
4. Whether the plaintiffs showed irreparable injury sufficient to support permanent injunctive relief.

## Decision

- The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs.
- The court held the beach right was an easement appurtenant that ran with the plaintiffs’ lots and bound successors to the servient parcel.
- The court concluded that a beach-use easement is not limited to access, but includes use and enjoyment consistent with the stated purpose (bathing).
- The court agreed that the defendant’s opening of the small beach to large-scale public use materially interfered with the plaintiffs’ easement rights.
- The court upheld injunctive relief based on irreparable injury from loss of meaningful enjoyment of the easement; public-access policy did not override the recorded private rights.

## Legal Principles

- An easement is appurtenant when it is tied to ownership of a dominant estate, benefits that estate, and continues through changes in ownership.
- Repeated deed language granting a right “together with” conveyed lots supports the conclusion that the right runs with the land as an appurtenant easement.
- A servient owner may use the servient land only to the extent that use does not unreasonably and materially interfere with the dominant owner’s easement.
- A beach easement for “bathing only” includes the ability to use and enjoy the beach for bathing-related recreation, not merely passage to the water.
- Ongoing deprivation of the practical benefit of an easement, especially where the injury is not readily measured in money, supports a finding of irreparable harm and permanent injunctive relief.
- General policy favoring public access does not negate or rewrite specific, recorded private easement rights between private parties.

## Conclusion

The court enforced a recorded beach-use easement as appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ lots and held that converting a tiny privately burdened beach into a heavily used public beach unreasonably and materially interfered with the easement, warranting an injunction despite generalized public-access policy arguments.


Leabo v. Leninski, 182 Conn. 611, 438 A.2d 1153 (Conn. 1981)