Lee v. Paulsen, 273 Or. 103 (1975)

Facts

  • James Lee, a nontenured public school teacher, received notice that his contract would not be renewed without stated reasons.
  • Through counsel, Lee demanded the specific reasons for nonrenewal and requested a public hearing.
  • The school district’s attorney sent Lee a letter listing specific reasons for nonrenewal and stating that the district would present no evidence and that officials and board members could not be questioned.
  • Lee read the letter and knew the content of the assertedly defamatory statements before any public hearing occurred.
  • At the public hearing, Lee’s counsel asked the board to state on the record the reasons for nonrenewal as set out in the letter.
  • The board orally repeated the letter’s contents at the hearing; Lee alleged this public repetition constituted defamatory publication.
  • Lee sued school officials and board members for defamation; defendants asserted absolute privilege based on Lee’s consent.

Issues

  1. Whether a defamatory publication made at a public hearing is absolutely privileged when it occurs at the plaintiff’s request and with the plaintiff’s prior knowledge and consent.
  2. Whether such consent bars a defamation action even if the statements would otherwise be defamatory.

Decision

  • The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the involuntary nonsuit for defendants.
  • The court assumed for decision that the statements were defamatory.
  • The court held the public repetition was absolutely privileged because Lee knowingly requested and consented to the publication.
  • Publication of false and defamatory matter is absolutely privileged if the person defamed consents to the publication, subject to limited exceptions not applicable here (Restatement (First) of Torts § 583).
  • Consent-based privilege does not depend on balancing competing public interests; consent removes the wrongful character of the publication.
  • When a plaintiff knows the contents of the proposed statement and affirmatively requests its communication, the plaintiff cannot later recover for that publication in defamation.
  • A request to repeat statements is not treated as nonconsensual merely because the repetition occurs in a public setting, where the public repetition is itself solicited by the plaintiff rather than made to correct an earlier public defamation.

Conclusion

Because Lee knew the content of the reasons for nonrenewal and asked the board to state those reasons publicly, he consented to the alleged defamatory publication; that consent created an absolute privilege barring his defamation claim, so the nonsuit was properly affirmed.