## Facts

- Patent applicants mailed four U.S. patent applications to the U.S. Patent Office from Connecticut on March 1, 1973, properly addressed, stamped, and marked “airmail.”
- Typical transit time for such mail was about two days.
- The Patent Office date-stamped the package and applications as received on March 8, 1973, using a routine practice in which two different employees independently checked and affixed receipt-date stamps; both stamps reflected March 8.
- The applicants needed a U.S. receipt date no later than March 6, 1973, to obtain foreign-priority benefit under 35 U.S.C. § 119 and avoid intervening prior art affecting three applications.
- The applicants petitioned the Commissioner to change the filing date, asserting the package must have arrived by March 6; the petition was denied.
- The applicants sued in federal district court seeking an order requiring the Commissioner to assign a filing date no later than March 6.
- On cross-motions for summary judgment based on pleadings and affidavits, the district court granted summary judgment to the applicants, relying on the presumption that properly mailed items are delivered in due course.
- The Commissioner appealed.

## Issues

1. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 301, does the presumption of receipt in due course arising from proof of proper mailing shift the burden of persuasion or only the burden of producing evidence?
2. Did the Patent Office’s evidence of its receipt and date-stamping procedures create a genuine dispute of material fact as to the actual receipt date, making summary judgment for the applicants improper?

## Decision

- The court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the applicants and remanded.
- Federal Rule of Evidence 301 governs the mailbox presumption in federal court.
- The mailbox presumption shifts only the burden of production, not the burden of persuasion; the party asserting timely receipt retains the risk of nonpersuasion.
- The Patent Office’s evidence of routine mail-handling practices and two independent March 8 receipt stamps was sufficient to rebut the presumption and require resolution by the fact-finder.

## Legal Principles

- Under FRE 301, a presumption requires the opposing party to produce evidence to rebut or meet the presumed fact, but it does not shift the ultimate burden of persuasion.
- Proof of proper addressing, postage, and mailing permits an inference (often expressed as a presumption) of receipt in the ordinary course of mail, but that presumption is rebuttable.
- Evidence of an institution’s routine practice and contemporaneous records (including duplicate receipt date-stamps applied under established procedures) may rebut the mailbox presumption and create a triable factual dispute.
- When rebuttal evidence is produced, the presumption no longer controls the outcome; the trier of fact must decide the issue based on all admissible evidence.

## Conclusion

Because the Patent Office produced evidence supporting the reliability of its receipt and date-stamping process, the dispute over the applications’ receipt date required fact-finding rather than summary judgment; the applicants retained the burden to prove timely receipt for foreign-priority purposes under FRE 301.


Legille v. Dann, 544 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)