## Facts

- Mark Leleck was driving on a highway when he left the roadway and struck a bridge piling.
- Leleck alleged the incident occurred because a tractor-trailer driven by Curtis Downs crossed the center lane and forced him off the road.
- On May 21, 1999, Leleck sued Triple G Express, Inc. (Triple G), alleging Triple G was vicariously liable for Downs’s negligence.
- Triple G timely answered the complaint but did not raise, as an affirmative defense, that Downs was not its employee.
- On October 12, 1999, in responses to Leleck’s interrogatories, Triple G admitted Downs “was Triple G’s contract employee at the time of the accident.”
- On June 22, 2001—more than a year and a half later and after the statute of limitations had expired—Triple G attempted to change its interrogatory responses to deny an employment relationship with Downs.
- Triple G moved for summary judgment, arguing Downs was an independent contractor and that Triple G could not be vicariously liable without an employer-employee relationship; it cited motor-carrier regulations and cases.
- Leleck filed his own motion for summary judgment, relying on Triple G’s prior admission and arguing Triple G could not avoid responsibility by recharacterizing Downs’s status.
- Both cross-motions for summary judgment were before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

## Issues

1. Whether Triple G could, after the statute of limitations had run, withdraw or revise its interrogatory admission that Downs was its “contract employee” and instead argue he was an independent contractor.
2. Whether, on the summary-judgment record, Triple G could avoid vicarious liability for Downs’s alleged negligence by denying an employment/agency relationship.

## Decision

- Triple G’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
- Leleck’s motion for summary judgment was granted to the extent it sought a ruling that Triple G could not defeat vicarious liability by retracting its earlier admission and newly claiming Downs was an independent contractor.
- The case could proceed on negligence, causation, and damages, but Triple G was not permitted to escape vicarious responsibility on the theory that Downs was not its employee.

## Legal Principles

- Interrogatory answers may operate as binding admissions against the responding party in the case, limiting later attempts to take a contradictory position.
- A defendant’s failure to timely plead an affirmative defense (such as “not an employee/agent”) can weigh against later efforts to inject that defense after the case has progressed.
- Courts may refuse late changes to discovery positions where the opposing party relied on the earlier admission and would be unfairly prejudiced—especially when the statute of limitations has expired, eliminating the chance to sue another responsible actor.
- Under federal motor-carrier rules and related case law, a motor carrier generally cannot avoid responsibility for the conduct of drivers operating under its authority merely by labeling the driver an “independent contractor.”
- Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; a party’s binding admissions can remove the factual basis for a contrary theory at summary judgment.

## Conclusion

The court held Triple G to its prior discovery admission that Downs was its contract employee and rejected Triple G’s attempt—made after limitations had expired—to recast Downs as an independent contractor to defeat respondeat superior liability; accordingly, it denied Triple G’s summary-judgment motion and granted Leleck summary judgment on vicarious responsibility, leaving negligence and damages for later proceedings.


Leleck v. Triple G Express, Inc., 2002 WL 441337 (2002)