## Facts

- Josue Leocal, a Haitian citizen and lawful permanent resident since 1987, was convicted in Florida of driving under the influence causing serious bodily injury.
- The Florida offense required that the defendant drive under the influence and cause serious bodily injury, but did not require a particular mental state as to the injury (and at most involved negligence).
- Leocal pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 2.5 years’ imprisonment.
- Federal immigration authorities initiated removal proceedings, asserting the conviction was an “aggravated felony” because it was a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and carried a sentence of at least one year.
- An Immigration Judge ordered removal; the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed.
- The Eleventh Circuit dismissed Leocal’s petition for review under circuit precedent treating the Florida offense as a “crime of violence.”

## Issues

1. Whether a state DUI offense causing serious bodily injury that lacks a mens rea of purposefulness (and at most requires negligence) qualifies as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) or § 16(b).
2. If not a “crime of violence,” whether such a conviction can be treated as an “aggravated felony” under the Immigration and Nationality Act for purposes of removability.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.
- The Court held that Florida DUI causing serious bodily injury is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it does not require the “use” of physical force “against” another in the sense of active employment.
- The Court held the offense is not a “crime of violence” under § 16(b) because the statute’s “substantial risk” language concerns the risk that force will be intentionally used in committing the offense, not merely the risk that injury will occur.
- Because the conviction was not a “crime of violence,” it was not an INA “aggravated felony” under INA § 101(a)(43)(F) on that basis.

## Legal Principles

- Interpretation of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16 is categorical, focusing on the elements and nature of the offense of conviction rather than the case-specific facts.
- Section 16(a)’s “use of physical force against” another generally requires active employment of force and does not naturally cover accidental or negligent infliction of injury.
- Section 16(b)’s “substantial risk” that force “may be used” refers to a risk that the offender will use force in the course of committing the offense, which presupposes more than negligence.
- Ordinary DUI offenses lacking purposeful or knowing force, even when resulting in serious injury, do not fit § 16’s definition of “crime of violence” and therefore do not qualify as aggravated felonies under the INA on that theory.

## Conclusion

A DUI causing serious bodily injury that does not require purposeful, knowing, or similarly directed use of force is not a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and thus cannot be treated as an INA aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F) for removal.


Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004)