## Facts

- Lewis F. Lester, an associate professor at a college, sought tenure.
- While an undergraduate, Mary E. Powers took Lester’s abnormal psychology course, which included a class discussion about homosexuality and its classification as a disorder.
- Powers, then coming to terms with being a lesbian, interpreted Lester’s remarks and classroom handling of the topic as disapproving and offensive; Lester denied expressing or permitting prejudice.
- Powers promptly complained to an assistant dean and later repeated similar characterizations to various students, faculty, and administrators, but did not file a formal complaint or approach Lester directly.
- During Lester’s tenure review, the college solicited alumni letters; Powers submitted a late letter that the administration accepted.
- In her letter, Powers offered personal observations and assessments, describing Lester in terms such as “homophobic,” “offensive,” “insensitive,” “intimidating,” and similar evaluative characterizations tied to her classroom experience.
- The tenure committee considered Powers’s letter during deliberations and ultimately denied Lester tenure.
- Lester sued Powers for libel, slander, and tortious interference with contract, alleging her oral and written statements caused the tenure denial.

## Issues

1. Whether Powers’s statements describing Lester as “homophobic,” “offensive,” “insensitive,” and similar terms were actionable defamatory statements of fact or non-actionable opinion based on disclosed or known facts.
2. Whether Powers’s communications in the tenure-review process were protected by a qualified privilege, and whether Lester produced evidence of abuse of that privilege (e.g., knowing falsity, reckless disregard, or malice).
3. Whether the tortious interference claim could proceed when based on the same allegedly defamatory communications.

## Decision

- The court affirmed summary judgment for Powers on all claims.
- The court held Powers’s challenged statements were non-actionable opinion/value judgments drawn from disclosed or commonly known underlying facts.
- The court held Powers’s tenure-related communications were protected by a qualified privilege applicable to requested evaluative statements in an employment/tenure setting.
- The court found no triable evidence that Powers abused the privilege by knowingly making false statements, acting with reckless disregard, or acting with malice sufficient to defeat the privilege.
- Because the interference claim rested on the same protected communications, it failed with the defamation claims.

## Legal Principles

- Evaluative characterizations not readily provable as true or false (e.g., “homophobic,” “offensive,” “insensitive”) are generally treated as opinion, particularly when tied to disclosed or known facts that allow the audience to form its own judgment.
- A qualified privilege protects good-faith communications made on a subject in which the speaker has an interest or duty to an audience with a corresponding interest or duty, including requested assessments in employment and academic tenure processes.
- The privilege is defeated only by evidence of abuse, such as knowing falsity, reckless disregard for truth, or malice/improper motive as defined by applicable state precedent.
- When a tortious interference claim is predicated on the same speech that is non-actionable opinion or privileged, the interference claim typically cannot stand.

## Conclusion

The court ruled that Powers’s alumni feedback during a tenure review consisted of protected opinion and, independently, was covered by a qualified privilege for requested evaluative communications; lacking evidence of privilege abuse, Lester’s defamation and related tortious interference claims could not proceed.


Lester v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65 (Me. 1991)