## Facts

- Michael Levin, a tenured philosophy professor at a public college, published three extramural writings (two letters and a book review) containing derogatory statements about Black people.
- The writings generated public controversy and criticism.
- After the semester began, the dean created an “alternative” section of Levin’s introductory philosophy course and notified Levin’s students of the option to transfer, without notice to Levin.
- The college had not previously created such an alternative section for a specific professor, and no student had complained that Levin treated students unfairly based on race.
- The college president announced at a press conference the formation of an ad hoc committee to investigate whether Levin’s views affected his ability to teach.
- Levin testified that internal communications and the committee process led him to fear termination, causing him to decline numerous invitations to speak or write about his views.
- The committee ultimately recommended no discipline and stated that a professor should not be disciplined for speech made outside the classroom.
- Levin sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment and due process violations; the district court found violations and granted injunctive relief.

## Issues

1. Whether creating a “shadow” or “alternative” class for students to avoid a professor, in response to the professor’s protected extramural speech and without evidence of classroom misconduct, violates the First Amendment.
2. Whether the ad hoc committee process and related official actions unconstitutionally chilled the professor’s speech.
3. Whether injunctive relief barring future disciplinary proceedings was appropriate, or whether declaratory relief was the proper remedy.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the finding that the “shadow class” violated Levin’s First Amendment rights.
- The court treated the alternative section as a stigmatizing, punitive response to protected speech, not justified by any demonstrated pedagogical or classroom-based concern.
- The court accepted evidence that the committee process and surrounding circumstances chilled Levin’s speech.
- The court vacated the injunction barring future disciplinary proceedings and replaced it with a declaratory judgment that discipline based solely on Levin’s out-of-class speech would be unconstitutional.
- The judgment was affirmed in part and vacated in part.

## Legal Principles

- A public university may not take adverse, stigmatizing administrative actions against a faculty member because of protected extramural speech absent a legitimate, speech-neutral educational justification grounded in actual teaching-related concerns.
- Government actions that reasonably cause a public employee to refrain from protected speech can constitute an unconstitutional chilling effect even if formal discipline is never imposed.
- Equitable relief must be tailored to the likelihood and immediacy of future harm; where future discipline is speculative, declaratory relief may be appropriate and an injunction may be improper.
- In the university setting, First Amendment analysis gives weight to protecting faculty speech on matters of public concern, particularly when there is no evidence of discriminatory or deficient classroom conduct.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that creating an unprecedented “shadow class” to allow students to avoid a professor due to his protected extramural writings violated the First Amendment, and while it recognized that the university’s investigation chilled speech, it limited the remedy to a declaration that discipline based solely on the professor’s out-of-class speech would be unconstitutional.


Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992)