## Facts

- The Trustees of the United Mine Workers of America Welfare and Retirement Fund (plaintiffs) sued Cable (defendant), an individual coal operator, in federal district court to recover unpaid royalty contributions measured per ton of coal produced for use or sale.
- Plaintiffs sought 20¢ per ton for coal produced during the term of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1948 and 30¢ per ton for coal produced during the term of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1950.
- Cable was a member of the Somerset County Coal Operators Association of Pennsylvania, which signed the 1948 and 1950 wage agreements on behalf of its members.
- Cable made the required 20¢-per-ton payments under the 1948 agreement for a period of time, paying on coal produced through April 30, 1949, and then stopped making the royalty payments.
- After Cable stopped paying, plaintiffs’ counsel sent a demand letter (October 10, 1949) asserting that the royalties were “due and owing” under the 1948 agreement and warning that legal action would be taken to compel compliance with Cable’s contractual obligations.
- Cable responded in writing (October 12, 1949) stating that he owed the UMWA welfare fund, that he was not then able to pay, and that when operations resumed his broker would advance money that would be sent “at once to apply on the welfare fund.”
- Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing that the association had authority to bind Cable and that, even if it did not, Cable ratified the agreements by making payments and acknowledging the debt in writing.
- Cable opposed summary judgment with an affidavit claiming (among other things) that he paid only because he feared a strike and business loss, that he did not intend to ratify either agreement, and that he lacked full knowledge of material facts concerning the 1948 agreement.

## Issues

1. Whether Cable was bound to the royalty obligations of the 1948 and 1950 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements because the operators association had authority (including apparent authority) to execute the agreements on his behalf.
2. If the association lacked authority, whether Cable ratified the agreements—and thus became bound—by making royalty payments and later acknowledging the obligation in writing after receiving a demand asserting contractual liability.
3. Whether Cable’s affidavit alleging lack of intent, economic pressure from fear of strike, and lack of knowledge created a genuine dispute of material fact that required a trial rather than summary judgment.

## Decision

- The court granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
- The court concluded that Cable was liable for the per-ton welfare-fund royalties claimed under the wage agreements because the undisputed record established, at a minimum, ratification through Cable’s payments under the agreement and his written acknowledgment of the debt after being notified that plaintiffs were asserting contractual liability.
- The court held that Cable’s asserted subjective lack of intent to ratify, and his claim that he paid out of fear of strike-related consequences, did not create a triable issue where his objective conduct and written admission showed acceptance of the obligation as a matter of law.

## Legal Principles

- An agent’s execution of a contract may bind a principal where the agent had authority, including apparent authority arising from the principal’s manifestations and the counterparty’s reasonable reliance.
- Even if authority is initially lacking, a principal can become bound by ratification, which may be shown by conduct consistent with affirming the contract (such as making payments required by it) and by express written acknowledgment of the obligation after notice of the asserted contractual basis.
- Ratification is determined from objective acts and statements; a party’s later claim that he did not “intend” to ratify does not negate ratification established by undisputed conduct.
- Generalized economic pressure, such as fear of a strike or business loss, does not by itself render payments or acknowledgments legally involuntary so as to defeat ratification on this record.
- Summary judgment is proper when the material facts are not genuinely disputed and the remaining question is the legal effect of those facts under agency and contract doctrines.

## Conclusion

In Lewis v. Cable, the district court entered summary judgment for the fund trustees, holding that the coal operator was obligated to pay the per-ton welfare-fund royalties required by the 1948 and 1950 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements because his payments under the 1948 agreement and his later written acknowledgment of the debt—made after an express demand based on contractual obligations—amounted to ratification as a matter of law, leaving no genuine issue for trial.


Lewis v. Cable, 107 F. Supp. 196 (1952)