## Facts

- *Time* magazine published an April 10, 1978 cover story on lawyer ethics and discipline that criticized a Northern California attorney, Jerome R. Lewis, by name.
- The article stated Lewis was still practicing law despite a $100,000 malpractice judgment in 1970 and a $60,000 judgment including punitive damages in 1974 for defrauding clients.
- Lewis sued for libel, slander, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; the case was removed to federal court on diversity grounds.
- The district court treated Lewis’s multiple tort theories as a single defamation claim based on the publication.
- Lewis did not timely demand a jury under the federal rules; after removal he requested a jury roughly nine months after the defendant answered and sought discretionary relief.
- The district court ultimately denied a jury trial, conducted a bench trial, and entered judgment for the publisher.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying relief for an untimely jury demand under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 38 and 39(b).
2. Whether the publication was actionable defamation under constitutional and state-law standards, including truth/substantial truth and the required level of fault.

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit affirmed.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a late jury demand where the delay was substantial and the explanation amounted to inadvertence.
- Judgment for the publisher was proper because the challenged statements were substantially true and the plaintiff failed to prove the constitutionally required fault (including actual malice to the extent applicable).
- The privacy and emotional-distress theories failed because they sought recovery for the same publication-based injury and could not avoid defamation limits.

## Legal Principles

- A jury demand must be served within the time specified by Rule 38; failure to do so constitutes waiver absent discretionary relief.
- Under Rule 39(b), granting a jury trial after waiver is discretionary; a court may deny relief when the delay is lengthy and the reason is mere oversight.
- Truth is a complete defense to defamation; “substantial truth” suffices when minor inaccuracies do not change the gist or sting of the publication.
- For speech on matters of public concern, and for public officials/public figures (including limited-purpose public figures), recovery requires proof of constitutionally required fault; actual malice requires knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard shown by serious doubts about truth.
- Claims re-labeled as privacy or emotional distress that are based on the same allegedly defamatory publication are subject to the same constitutional constraints and rise or fall with the defamation claim.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit upheld a bench-trial judgment for a magazine publisher, ruling that the district court properly denied an untimely jury demand and that the plaintiff could not establish actionable defamation where the article’s core assertions were substantially true and the required constitutional fault standard was not met.


Lewis v. Time Inc., 710 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1983)