## Facts

- Kathleen Lifton was a long-tenured kindergarten teacher at a Chicago public elementary school and served as a teacher representative on the school’s Local School Council (LSC).
- Lifton proposed changes to the kindergarten program, including altered dismissal times and a revised daily schedule emphasizing academics in the morning.
- The principal declined to implement the proposals for the upcoming year, indicating they could be discussed later.
- Lifton opposed early renewal of the principal’s contract and participated in contentious LSC discussions about the renewal and kindergarten policy.
- Lifton sent a flyer to parents inviting them to attend an upcoming LSC meeting and participate.
- Lifton alleged that, in response to her positions and speech, school officials retaliated by undermining her authority, creating a hostile work environment, and making defamatory statements about her conduct and performance.
- Lifton resigned in January 2003, claiming constructive discharge; defendants treated the resignation as voluntary.
- Lifton sued the Board of Education, the Chicago Public Schools CEO, and the principal under § 1983 and Illinois law; defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims.

## Issues

1. Whether Lifton engaged in constitutionally protected speech as a public employee (as a citizen on a matter of public concern) and, if so, whether there was sufficient evidence that the speech caused actionable retaliation.
2. Whether Lifton had a protected property interest in continued employment, or a protected liberty interest implicated by stigmatizing statements, such that due process required additional procedures.
3. Whether the alleged statements constituted actionable defamation under Illinois law (false statement of fact, unprivileged publication, and damages).
4. Whether defendants’ alleged conduct satisfied Illinois’s “extreme and outrageous” standard and other elements for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment for all defendants on all counts.
- The court rejected the First Amendment retaliation claim, concluding the challenged speech was primarily an internal workplace dispute and not protected speech on a matter of public concern, and/or that the evidence did not establish actionable retaliation causally tied to protected speech.
- The court rejected the due process claim, finding no protected property interest in continued employment and no constitutionally cognizable liberty-interest deprivation requiring a name-clearing hearing.
- The court rejected the defamation claim, finding failures as to falsity, actionable fact versus opinion, privilege, and/or proof of damages.
- The court rejected the IIED claim, holding the alleged workplace conduct did not meet the high “extreme and outrageous” threshold and the record did not support the remaining elements.

## Legal Principles

- A public employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim requires speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern, plus proof that the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment action (subject to employer-interest balancing).
- Procedural due process requires a protected property or liberty interest; without a legitimate entitlement to continued employment, no property interest exists.
- A due process liberty-interest claim based on reputational harm generally requires sufficiently stigmatizing, false statements published in connection with termination or a comparable alteration of legal status.
- Under Illinois defamation law, a plaintiff must prove a false statement of fact, unprivileged publication, and resulting damages; non-verifiable opinions and substantially true statements are not actionable, and qualified privileges may apply absent proof overcoming them.
- Under Illinois IIED law, liability requires extreme and outrageous conduct, intent or knowledge of a high probability of causing distress, and severe emotional distress; ordinary employment disputes and criticism usually do not qualify.

## Conclusion

The court entered judgment for the defendants because Lifton’s speech was treated as an internal employment dispute rather than protected public-concern expression, and she failed to establish the required elements for due process, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.


Lifton v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 318 F. Supp. 2d 674 (N.D. Ill. 2004)