## Facts

- Congress authorized creation of forest reserves and empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate their use, occupancy, and preservation.
- The Secretary issued regulations for the Holy Cross Forest Reserve in Colorado that limited grazing and generally required permits before stock could graze, with minor exceptions for small numbers of animals.
- Fred Light owned a ranch near the reserve and a herd of about 500 cattle; he typically turned the cattle out to range during spring and summer.
- The United States alleged Light turned his cattle loose knowing and expecting they would enter the reserve to graze because forage and water there were better and access was natural via trails and streams.
- The United States alleged Light refused to seek a permit, declared his intent to disregard the regulations, and intended to continue allowing his cattle to graze on the reserve.
- Light relied on a Colorado fence statute, arguing the United States could not obtain relief for trespass on unfenced land unless it fenced the reserve as state law prescribed.

## Issues

1. Whether Congress, under the Property Clause, may set aside federal lands as forest reserves and regulate or prohibit grazing thereon.
2. Whether authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to issue grazing and forest-preservation regulations is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
3. Whether a state fence law bars federal equitable relief for cattle trespass on unfenced federal land.
4. Whether past federal tolerance of grazing on the public domain created a vested right or irrevocable implied license to graze.
5. Whether equity may enjoin a cattle owner who turns cattle loose intending they will graze on a forest reserve without a permit and threatens to persist.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against Light.
- Congress has broad power under Article IV, § 3, cl. 2 to control federal property, including reserving land and regulating or prohibiting grazing.
- Congress may authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to issue administrative rules governing national forest use; this is not an unlawful delegation where Congress sets the policy and statutory consequences.
- Longstanding federal acquiescence in public-land grazing created no vested right; any implied permission remained revocable.
- State fence laws do not immunize willful or intentional trespass; they may affect liability for merely straying cattle but not deliberate conduct intended to cause grazing on another’s land.
- A federal court of equity may enjoin intentional grazing trespass on a national forest “whether the land has been fenced or not.”

## Legal Principles

- Under the Property Clause, Congress’s control over federal lands includes power to reserve lands and to regulate their occupancy and use.
- Congress may condition grazing on federal reservations on compliance with federally prescribed permit and stocking rules.
- Delegation is permissible when Congress sets the governing policy and statutory penalty and authorizes executive officers to make administrative rules implementing that policy.
- Past governmental tolerance of public-land use is a revocable implied license that confers no vested rights against later withdrawal or regulation.
- State fence statutes cannot bar equitable relief against intentional trespass on federal lands, even if the lands are unfenced.

## Conclusion

The Court upheld federal authority to regulate and restrict grazing on national forests through administrative regulations and held that intentional, threatened continuing trespass by turning cattle loose to graze on a forest reserve may be enjoined notwithstanding state fence laws and the absence of fencing.


Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911)