## Facts

- Edward P. Lind, through his conservator, sued Medevac, Inc. and two employees for personal injuries in superior court.
- After a jury returned a defense verdict, Lind sought a new trial and JNOV, alleging jury misconduct.
- Defendants argued the new-trial motion failed because it lacked juror affidavits required by Code of Civil Procedure § 658.
- Lind claimed he could not obtain affidavits because defense counsel sent jurors a post-verdict letter warning that the losing side might hire investigators to “impeach” the verdict, advising jurors they had no obligation to speak or sign statements, and suggesting “sharp investigative tactics” could lead to the verdict being set aside.
- The trial court denied the new-trial and JNOV motions for lack of an adequate evidentiary showing of misconduct.
- Separately, the trial court found the juror letter improper and interfering with the opposing party’s efforts to investigate misconduct, and imposed $20,000 in monetary sanctions against defense counsel and his firm under Code of Civil Procedure § 128 (inherent authority).
- Counsel and the firm appealed the sanctions order.

## Issues

1. Whether a trial court may impose monetary sanctions against an attorney and law firm based solely on inherent authority under Code of Civil Procedure § 128, absent express statutory authorization.
2. Whether the post-verdict juror letter discouraging cooperation with investigators was improper professional conduct supporting sanctions through an authorized mechanism.

## Decision

- The Court of Appeal reversed the $20,000 sanctions order.
- The court held § 128 and inherent authority, standing alone, do not authorize monetary sanctions; such sanctions require express statutory authorization.
- The court agreed the juror letter was improper because it tended to deter legitimate inquiry into potential juror misconduct and could affect jurors’ future conduct.
- The case was remanded for the trial court to consider whether sanctions could be imposed under Code of Civil Procedure § 128.5 (bad-faith tactics) with proper findings and procedures, and whether to refer counsel to the State Bar.

## Legal Principles

- Monetary sanctions against attorneys must be grounded in a specific statute; inherent judicial authority under Code of Civil Procedure § 128 is insufficient.
- Courts may regulate attorney conduct and protect the integrity of proceedings, but fee-like or monetary sanctions require legislative authorization (consistent with Bauguess v. Paine and related authority).
- Post-verdict communications with jurors that discourage cooperation with lawful investigations into potential misconduct may violate professional standards and can warrant discipline or statutorily authorized sanctions.
- When a sanctions order cites an improper legal basis, an appellate court will not affirm it on a different statutory ground the trial court did not actually invoke without appropriate trial-level findings and procedures.

## Conclusion

The court reversed monetary sanctions imposed under § 128 because inherent authority does not permit such awards without explicit statutory authorization, while recognizing that counsel’s juror letter was improper and could support sanctions or discipline if pursued under a proper statutory and procedural framework.


Lind v. Medevac, Inc., 219 Cal. App. 3d 516, 268 Cal. Rptr. 359 (Ct. App. 1990)