## Facts

- U.S. nationals and their relatives sued Arab Bank, PLC, for injuries and deaths from 24 terrorist attacks in Israel and the Palestinian territories during the Second Intifada (roughly 2000–2005).
- Plaintiffs asserted civil claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), alleging Arab Bank knowingly provided financial services to Hamas operatives, Hamas-controlled charities, and an organization (the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Intifada Al–Quds) that made payments to families of suicide bombers.
- The litigation involved extensive discovery disputes; the court imposed sanctions for nonproduction of certain records, including a permissive adverse-inference instruction and evidence preclusion on specified topics.
- The case proceeded to a bellwether jury trial on liability, and the jury found that Hamas perpetrated the 24 attacks and that Arab Bank was liable under the ATA.
- After the verdict, Arab Bank moved for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) or, alternatively, a new trial under Rule 59, challenging sanctions, jury instructions, trial structure, and multiple evidentiary rulings.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support ATA liability, requiring judgment for Arab Bank under Rule 50(b).
2. Whether the sanctions regime, including a permissive adverse-inference instruction, so prejudiced Arab Bank that a new trial was required.
3. Whether the jury instructions correctly stated the ATA requirements, including the “act of international terrorism” element and proximate causation.
4. Whether the evidence adequately established attribution of the attacks to Hamas and Arab Bank’s knowledge or reckless disregard regarding Hamas and Hamas-linked entities.
5. Whether challenged evidentiary rulings (including admission of Hamas claims of responsibility, foreign government designation materials, the FinCEN assessment, and expert testimony) were erroneous and prejudicial.
6. Whether the bellwether trial structure and related case-management decisions denied Arab Bank a fair trial, and whether certification for interlocutory appeal was warranted.

## Decision

- The court denied Arab Bank’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law.
- The court denied Arab Bank’s Rule 59 motion for a new trial.
- The court upheld the permissive adverse-inference instruction as limited and nonmandatory, and found it did not shift the burden of proof from plaintiffs.
- The court held the jury was properly instructed on the relevant legal elements as framed by the court, including international terrorism and causation.
- The court found the trial evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Arab Bank knowingly provided financial services that substantially supported Hamas’s attacks and foreseeably contributed to plaintiffs’ injuries.
- The court declined to certify issues for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

## Legal Principles

- Rule 50(b) relief is unavailable if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant on the essential elements.
- A permissive adverse-inference instruction, limited to specific missing evidence and paired with repeated burden-of-proof instructions, does not necessarily require a new trial.
- Under the court’s approach to § 2333(a), the relevant “acts of international terrorism” were the terrorist attacks causing plaintiffs’ injuries; a defendant may face liability if it knowingly provides services that substantially support those acts.
- ATA causation was assessed through proximate cause: whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm and whether the injuries were reasonably foreseeable, without requiring transaction-by-transaction tracing to a particular attack.
- Statements claiming responsibility for attacks may be admissible as declarations against interest under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) where exposure to criminal liability and corroborating circumstances support reliability.
- Authentication under Fed. R. Evid. 901 requires only a threshold showing; circumstantial proof and expert testimony may suffice.
- Government designation materials and regulatory assessments may be admitted with limiting instructions when offered for notice, knowledge, and state-of-mind purposes rather than as conclusive proof of illegality.

## Conclusion

The court left the jury’s ATA liability verdict intact, holding that the sanctions and bellwether trial management were fair, the jury instructions and evidentiary rulings were within the court’s discretion, and the evidence permitted a reasonable finding that Arab Bank knowingly provided financial services that proximately contributed to Hamas attacks that injured the plaintiffs.


Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)