## Facts

- Linmark Associates, Inc. owned residential property in Willingboro Township, New Jersey, and, with its listing agent William Mellman, sought to post a “For Sale” sign on the property.
- Willingboro experienced rapid demographic change and adopted policies aimed at preventing “panic selling” and perceived “white flight.”
- Before March 1974, “For Sale” and “Sold” signs were generally permitted subject to ordinary sign regulations.
- On March 18, 1974, the Township enacted Ordinance 5-1974, effectively banning “For Sale” and “Sold” signs on occupied residential property (with limited allowance for model homes).
- Petitioners listed the property for sale on March 26, 1974, but the ordinance barred them from using a lawn sign to advertise the sale.
- The Township defended the ordinance as a means to support a stable, racially integrated community by limiting visible signals thought to trigger increased sales activity.

## Issues

1. Whether a municipal ordinance prohibiting residential “For Sale” and “Sold” signs, adopted to prevent perceived white flight and preserve integration, violates the First Amendment as a restriction on truthful commercial speech.
2. Whether the ordinance may be upheld because alternative channels (e.g., newspapers and real estate listings) remain available.
3. Whether the ordinance is a content-neutral regulation of the manner or place of speech, or instead a content-based restriction aimed at the communicative impact of the message.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit and held the ordinance unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
- The Court treated residential “For Sale” and “Sold” signs as protected commercial speech conveying truthful information about property availability.
- The ordinance was not sustained as a mere time, place, or manner rule because it targeted specific messages and sought to prevent listeners from acting on the information.
- The existence of alternative advertising avenues did not save the ordinance; the remaining methods were more costly, less autonomous, less likely to reach casual viewers, and potentially less effective than lawn signs.
- Although the Township’s integration-related objective was significant, the First Amendment barred pursuing that aim by suppressing truthful commercial information; the record also did not show the ban was necessary to achieve the stated goal.
- Justice Rehnquist did not participate; no separate concurrences or dissents were issued.

## Legal Principles

- Truthful, non-misleading commercial speech about lawful activity is protected by the First Amendment.
- Government may not restrict the dissemination of truthful commercial information to influence private decisionmaking or to prevent the public from acting on that information.
- A regulation that singles out particular messages for prohibition because of feared audience reaction is content-based and is not justified merely by pointing to other, less effective or more burdensome communication channels.
- The availability of alternative means of communication does not alone validate a speech restriction when the restriction targets content and materially impairs an effective, low-cost method of conveying information.

## Conclusion

The Court invalidated Willingboro’s ban on residential “For Sale” and “Sold” signs because it was a content-based suppression of truthful commercial speech intended to limit the impact of real estate information on community behavior, a method the First Amendment does not permit even when pursued for an important public objective.


Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)