## Facts

- Dawn F. Littlejohn, an African-American woman, was hired in April 2009 as Director of the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Office at the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS).
- Her job duties included investigating discrimination complaints, training staff, monitoring hiring, counseling employees, organizing diversity activities, and advising on EEO policy; she alleged satisfactory performance.
- From April to December 2009, she reported to a deputy commissioner and received an above-average evaluation; she did not allege discrimination during this period.
- In December 2009, Amy Baker (white) became her supervisor and allegedly stated she had been instructed to “get rid of” Littlejohn and wanted to make her uncomfortable so she would leave.
- Littlejohn alleged that after she refused to drop an EEO investigation involving a high-level white male employee and after she complained internally about discrimination, Baker began actions to demote and replace her.
- Littlejohn alleged she was stripped of responsibilities, denied resources, excluded from meetings, reassigned to smaller office space, and otherwise demeaned.
- She was ultimately demoted, and a white employee, Brandon Stradford, allegedly assumed her former duties.
- Littlejohn sued the City and supervisors under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 for disparate treatment, retaliation, hostile work environment, and sexual harassment; the district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

## Issues

1. What must a plaintiff plead to state plausible Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation claims under Rule 12(b)(6) in the Second Circuit?
2. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged race-based disparate treatment and retaliation against the City under Title VII and against Baker under §§ 1981 and 1983 (and § 1981 for retaliation).
3. Whether the complaint plausibly alleged a Title VII hostile work environment and sexual harassment.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit vacated dismissal of Littlejohn’s Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation claims against the City.
- The court vacated dismissal of Littlejohn’s disparate treatment claim against Baker under §§ 1981 and 1983.
- The court vacated dismissal of Littlejohn’s retaliation claim against Baker under § 1981.
- The court affirmed dismissal of the Title VII hostile work environment and sexual harassment claims.
- The court affirmed dismissal of the remaining claims, including claims against Mattingly and Stradford, and remanded.

## Legal Principles

- At the pleading stage, a Title VII plaintiff need not plead facts establishing a full McDonnell Douglas prima facie case; McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary framework, not a pleading requirement.
- A discrimination complaint must allege facts that plausibly support at least a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.
- A retaliation complaint must plausibly allege protected activity, employer knowledge, a materially adverse action, and a plausible causal connection.
- A hostile work environment requires plausibly alleged conduct that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive environment.
- Individual liability under §§ 1981 and 1983 requires plausible allegations of the defendant’s personal involvement in the challenged employment action.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit clarified that employment discrimination and retaliation claims survive a motion to dismiss when the pleaded facts plausibly support a minimal inference of unlawful motive, and it reinstated Littlejohn’s demotion-based discrimination and retaliation claims while leaving dismissed her hostile work environment and sexual harassment theories for lack of sufficiently severe or pervasive, sex-based conduct.


Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015)