Facts
- A Camden, Arkansas, gift shop/service station was robbed and its owner, Evelyn Boughton, was shot and killed on February 14, 1978.
- Ardia McCree was arrested the same day while driving a car matching an eyewitness description of the getaway vehicle.
- McCree admitted being at the scene but claimed an unknown “tall black stranger” took his rifle and committed the murder; eyewitness accounts contradicted that claim.
- At McCree’s capital trial, the court removed for cause prospective jurors who stated they could never vote for the death penalty (Witherspoon-excludables); eight venire members were excluded.
- The resulting death-qualified jury convicted McCree of capital felony murder, but at the penalty phase imposed life imprisonment without parole rather than death.
- After state appeals and postconviction proceedings failed, McCree sought federal habeas relief, arguing that death qualification of the guilt-phase jury violated the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
- The district court granted relief based on social-science evidence and constitutional grounds; the Eighth Circuit affirmed on fair-cross-section grounds.
Issues
- Whether the Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement forbids removing, before the guilt phase of a bifurcated capital trial, prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their sentencing-phase duties.
- Whether such death qualification violates the Sixth Amendment impartial-jury requirement, including on the theory that death-qualified juries are more likely to convict.
Decision
- The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit in a 6–3 opinion by Justice Rehnquist.
- The Court held that the Constitution permits States to remove for cause, before the guilt phase, jurors whose views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair performance of their duties at sentencing.
- The Court rejected the fair-cross-section challenge, concluding that Witherspoon-excludables are not a “distinctive group” for fair-cross-section purposes and that the doctrine targets venires rather than requiring any particular petit-jury composition.
- Assuming without deciding that death-qualified juries may be somewhat more conviction-prone, the Court held that this does not establish a Sixth Amendment impartial-jury violation.
- Habeas relief was denied, and the conviction and sentence remained in place.
Legal Principles
- The Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section requirement applies to the jury venire and does not require that the petit jury mirror the community’s composition.
- A fair-cross-section claim requires systematic exclusion of a “distinctive group”; groups defined by attitudes that would prevent or substantially impair juror duties are not “distinctive groups” for this purpose.
- States may “death-qualify” a capital jury by excluding for cause jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair their ability to follow the law at sentencing, even when selection occurs before the guilt phase.
- The impartial-jury requirement is evaluated by whether individual jurors can follow the law and decide the case based on evidence, not by statistical claims about group-level conviction tendencies.
Conclusion
The Court held that excluding jurors categorically unwilling to consider the death penalty, prior to the guilt phase of a capital trial, does not violate the Sixth Amendment’s fair-cross-section or impartial-jury guarantees as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.