## Facts

- David Lola, a licensed attorney, worked about fifteen months as a contract attorney on a large document-review project connected to federal multidistrict litigation.
- Lola was employed by a legal staffing firm and staffed to work for a law firm on the project.
- He alleged his tasks were routine and mechanical, requiring no legal judgment, including:
  - searching documents for specified terms;
  - coding documents into predetermined categories set by supervising attorneys; and
  - occasionally applying redactions using prescribed procedures.
- Lola worked approximately 45–55 hours per week at $25 per hour and alleged he received no overtime premium for hours over 40.
- He brought a putative collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) seeking overtime pay.

## Issues

1. Whether state law informs the meaning of “practice of law” for purposes of the FLSA regulation exempting licensed attorneys who are “actually engaged” in practicing law.
2. Whether, at the pleading stage, Lola plausibly alleged he was not “actually engaged in the practice of law” because his document review lacked independent legal judgment.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings.
- The court agreed that state law informs what constitutes the “practice of law” under the FLSA attorney exemption and that North Carolina law applied based on where Lola lived and worked.
- The court held that, taking the complaint’s allegations as true, Lola plausibly alleged his work was devoid of legal judgment and therefore may not have been the practice of law.
- The court rejected a per se rule that all document review is necessarily the practice of law.

## Legal Principles

- Under 29 C.F.R. § 541.304(a)(1), a licensed attorney is exempt from FLSA overtime only if the attorney is “actually engaged” in practicing law.
- Where the regulation does not define “practice of law,” courts may look to the applicable state’s definition to determine whether the exemption applies.
- Under North Carolina’s conception of practicing law, the practice of law requires at least a modicum of independent legal judgment.
- Work that is purely mechanical—performed strictly by following detailed, predetermined coding or redaction instructions—may fall outside the practice of law, depending on how the work is structured and supervised.
- Whether document review is exempt legal work can be fact-dependent; document review is not automatically exempt in all forms.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit held that, although state law governs the meaning of “practice of law” for the FLSA attorney exemption, a contract attorney can plausibly plead nonexempt status where the alleged document-review work is purely mechanical and lacks independent legal judgment, warranting further proceedings rather than dismissal.


Lola v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, 620 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2015)