## Facts

- In 1919, Henry Long conveyed separate tracts to each of his three children using language such as “to Jesse S. Long, and the children of his body begotten, and their heirs and assigns forever,” creating a fee tail in each grantee.
- Henry Long died in 1932. His will directed sale of certain identified real estate, payment of legacies from the sale proceeds, and distribution of any remaining proceeds to specified children “having issue,” but contained no general residuary clause and did not expressly dispose of any reversionary interest in the fee-tail tracts.
- Jesse S. Long later executed a quitclaim deed (1945) conveying whatever interest he had in his tract to Rosella Long; subsequent quitclaim transfers ultimately placed that claimed interest in Howard W. Long and his wife.
- Jesse died intestate and without issue in 1974, causing the fee tail to fail for lack of lineal descendants.
- Other relevant family events included intestate and testate successions among Henry’s descendants, including Eugene Long’s will naming his widow, Bessie Long, as sole beneficiary and specifically mentioning the disputed real estate.
- After Jesse’s death without issue, the parties disputed ownership of the tract originally conveyed to Jesse, focusing on (i) the nature of Henry’s retained interest after the fee-tail conveyance, (ii) when that interest descended, and (iii) whether Henry’s will disposed of it.

## Issues

1. What interest remains in the grantor after a conveyance creating a fee tail in Ohio, and what effect does Ohio’s statutory restriction on entails have on that interest?
2. Does the grantor’s retained interest descend to the grantor’s heirs at the grantor’s death, or only upon the failure of the fee tail (here, when the donee dies without issue)?
3. Whether a will provision dealing with sale of specified real estate and distribution of the sale proceeds operates as a general residuary clause disposing of the grantor’s reversionary interest in fee-tail property.

## Decision

- The court held the 1919 conveyance created a fee tail in Jesse S. Long.
- The grantor (Henry Long) retained a reversion in fee simple expectant on failure of the fee tail; the reversion was descendible, devisable, and alienable.
- The reversion passed at Henry’s death to his heirs then living, unless disposed of by will.
- Henry’s will, lacking a general residuary clause, did not devise the reversion; it passed by intestacy.
- Upon Jesse’s death without issue, the tract reverted in fee simple to those holding through Henry’s heirs at Henry’s death; judgment for the plaintiff heirs was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- Ohio recognizes the common-law fee tail; the statute restricting entails (now R.C. 2131.08) limits entailment to the first donee’s immediate issue but does not reduce the donee’s estate to a mere life estate.
- Creation of a fee tail leaves in the grantor a reversion in fee simple expectant on the stated condition (failure of issue), which is descendible, devisable, and alienable.
- If not otherwise disposed of, the grantor’s reversion passes by descent upon the grantor’s death to the grantor’s heirs then living; later failure of the fee tail affects possession, not the identity of those heirs.
- Absent a general residuary clause, a will provision directing sale of specified real estate and distributing the residue of the sale proceeds disposes only of those proceeds and does not devise other property interests of the testator.

## Conclusion

The court determined that a fee-tail conveyance leaves the grantor with a present reversion in fee simple that descends at the grantor’s death to then-living heirs, and that a will lacking a general residuary clause does not dispose of that reversion through clauses limited to sale proceeds, so the property reverted to successors of the grantor’s heirs when the donee died without issue.


Long v. Long, 45 Ohio St. 2d 165, 343 N.E.2d 100 (Ohio 1976)