Facts
- In two separate lawsuits, Loper Bright Enterprises and other operators in the Atlantic herring-fishing industry (collectively, Loper Bright) challenged a federal rule requiring certain herring vessels to carry at-sea monitors and, when federal funding was unavailable, to pay the monitors’ costs themselves (often about $700+ per day).
- The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), within the Department of Commerce, issued the rule under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA), which governs federal fishery management plans and related monitoring measures.
- Loper Bright alleged the MSA did not authorize NMFS to require regulated parties to fund the monitoring program and sought relief under the MSA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
- In both cases, federal district courts granted summary judgment to the government, concluding that the MSA did not clearly answer the cost-allocation question and deferring to NMFS’s interpretation under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed in Loper Bright’s case, applying Chevron’s framework and accepting NMFS’s reading as reasonable; in a companion case, the First Circuit likewise affirmed on similar reasoning.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari in No. 22-451 limited to whether Chevron should be overruled or clarified, and it considered the companion case alongside it.
Issues
- Whether the APA, including 5 U.S.C. § 706, requires courts to exercise independent judgment in determining whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, rather than deferring to an agency’s reasonable interpretation when a statute is ambiguous.
- Whether Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. should be overruled.
Decision
- Yes. The Supreme Court held that the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment in deciding whether an agency acted within its statutory authority; courts may not defer to an agency’s interpretation of law simply because a statute is ambiguous.
- The Court overruled Chevron’s requirement of mandatory deference to reasonable agency interpretations at “step two” after finding statutory ambiguity.
- Because the lower courts relied on Chevron in upholding NMFS’s rule, the Court vacated the judgments and remanded for reconsideration under the independent-judgment approach.
- The Court did not decide whether the MSA authorizes NMFS to require industry-funded monitoring; that statutory question was left for the lower courts to address on remand without Chevron.
- In this case, the vote was 6–2; Chief Justice Roberts wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. Justice Jackson took no part. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justice Sotomayor.
Legal Principles
- Under 5 U.S.C. § 706, reviewing courts must “decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,” which requires independent judicial judgment on statutory meaning.
- Statutory ambiguity does not by itself authorize a court to yield interpretive responsibility to an agency; ambiguity calls for the court to apply traditional tools of statutory interpretation.
- An agency’s statutory reading may still be considered and may carry weight to the extent it is persuasive (for example, based on consistency, thoroughness, and fit with the statutory scheme), but it is not controlling solely because the agency administers the statute.
- Overruling Chevron does not displace other review doctrines that involve deference on different grounds, including deference to agency factfinding under substantial-evidence review and review of discretionary policy choices under the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard.
- The decision does not automatically reopen prior judgments that applied Chevron; earlier holdings remain subject to ordinary stare decisis principles.
Conclusion
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo held that the APA requires courts to determine statutory meaning using their own judgment and forbids mandatory deference to agency interpretations based only on statutory ambiguity, overruling Chevron and sending the Atlantic herring monitoring disputes back to the lower courts to decide the MSA authorization question without Chevron’s framework.