## Facts

- Jose Lopez retained Clifford Law Offices, P.C., and attorney Thomas K. Prindable to pursue a wrongful-death claim arising from his daughter Elizabeth Lopez’s drowning in a swimming pool allegedly maintained by a school district (a local governmental entity).
- The firm later withdrew and sent Lopez a disengagement letter stating the statute of limitations was two years.
- The applicable limitations period for the contemplated defendant was one year from the date of death.
- Relying on the two-year advice, Lopez did not secure replacement counsel before the one-year period expired.
- After the one-year period had run (but before two years), another attorney filed the wrongful-death action; it was dismissed as untimely.
- Lopez sued the Clifford firm and Prindable for legal malpractice, alleging their incorrect limitations advice caused the loss of the wrongful-death claim; he also sued William King, the referring attorney, and named other lawyers as respondents in discovery.
- The circuit court dismissed under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) on the theory that the wrongful-death claim remained viable when the Clifford firm withdrew, defeating proximate cause as a matter of law.

## Issues

1. Whether a legal-malpractice complaint is defeated under 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) where the defendant attorneys withdrew while the underlying claim was still timely, but allegedly gave erroneous statute-of-limitations advice that contributed to a missed deadline.
2. Whether later consultations with, or involvement of, other attorneys necessarily constitute a superseding cause that breaks proximate causation at the pleading stage.

## Decision

- The appellate court reversed the dismissal and remanded.
- Taking the well-pleaded allegations as true and drawing reasonable inferences for Lopez, the complaint sufficiently alleged proximate cause based on incorrect limitations advice given at withdrawal.
- The court held that whether the Clifford defendants’ conduct was a substantial factor in the missed filing deadline, and whether any later attorney involvement was a superseding cause, presented factual questions not suitable for resolution on a § 2-619(a)(9) motion on the existing record.

## Legal Principles

- On a 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) motion, courts accept well-pleaded facts and reasonable inferences as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.
- In legal malpractice, proximate cause commonly turns on whether the alleged negligence was a substantial factor in producing the injury; that determination is often fact-dependent.
- An attorney’s incorrect statute-of-limitations advice given at or near withdrawal may support proximate cause where it plausibly induces client delay in securing replacement counsel and results in a missed deadline.
- A client’s later consultation with another lawyer, without formation of an attorney-client relationship and without timely assumption of responsibility for filing, does not necessarily relieve prior counsel of potential liability as a matter of law.

## Conclusion

The court held that Lopez’s allegations that withdrawing counsel misstated the limitations period and thereby contributed to the loss of a timely wrongful-death filing were sufficient to proceed, and that causation and any superseding cause from later attorney involvement required factual development rather than dismissal.


Lopez v. Clifford Law Offices, P.C., 362 Ill. App. 3d 969, 841 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)