## Facts

- Richard C. Lopiano (husband) and Shelley Lopiano (wife) married in 1962.
- During the marriage, Richard worked and later suffered a severe on-the-job injury in 1992 that left him permanently disabled.
- Richard brought a negligence action based on the accident.
- A jury awarded Richard $2,820,000, but the trial judge reduced the verdict to $800,000.
- The award included amounts attributed to pain and suffering and to lost wages (including wages that would have been earned after the marriage ended).
- In the dissolution case, the trial court treated Richard’s personal-injury recovery as “property” available for equitable distribution under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81.
- The trial court awarded Shelley a percentage of Richard’s net recovery, ordered alimony of $100 per week (to end when Shelley received 25% of Richard’s net recovery), and awarded Shelley $10,000 in attorney’s fees payable when Richard received the recovery.
- The trial court excluded five letters from Richard’s treating psychologists and psychiatrist that Richard offered regarding psychological disability.
- Richard appealed, arguing that some components of the recovery (especially pain and suffering and post-dissolution lost wages) were his separate property and should not be subject to distribution.

## Issues

1. Whether a spouse’s vested personal-injury judgment constitutes “property” under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81 and is available for equitable distribution, including portions attributed to pain and suffering and to post-dissolution lost wages.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the wife a percentage of the husband’s personal-injury recovery.
3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding alimony under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-82.
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-62 and in excluding the treating providers’ letters from evidence.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
- The court held that the personal-injury recovery, reduced to a vested judgment before dissolution, was an existing property interest and therefore “property” under § 46b-81.
- The court rejected the argument that the pain-and-suffering portion and the portion tied to wages after dissolution were categorically excluded from distribution; even if those components were personal to the injured spouse, they were still within the court’s distributive authority.
- The award to Shelley of a percentage of the net recovery was within the trial court’s discretion after considering the statutory factors governing equitable distribution.
- The alimony award of $100 per week, terminating when Shelley received 25% of the net recovery, was not an abuse of discretion.
- The $10,000 attorney’s-fee award, payable upon receipt of the recovery, was not an abuse of discretion.
- The exclusion of the five letters from Richard’s treating psychologists and psychiatrist was upheld; the letters did not qualify for admission under the cited statutory hearsay exceptions, particularly where prepared for litigation rather than made in the regular course of treatment or business.

## Legal Principles

- Under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46b-81, “property” includes a presently existing, vested interest; it is not limited to assets already in hand at the time of dissolution.
- In Connecticut dissolution actions, the court may distribute property owned by either spouse, whether held jointly or individually; labeling an asset “marital” or “personal” does not control whether it may be distributed, though it may affect what distribution is fair.
- A vested personal-injury judgment can be treated as distributable property under § 46b-81, even when the award includes pain and suffering and wage loss extending beyond dissolution.
- Financial orders in dissolution (property distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees) are reviewed for abuse of discretion; reversal is warranted only when the result is not reasonably supported by the record and the statutory criteria.
- Documentary hearsay exceptions for medical or similar records are applied according to their terms; letters prepared for litigation and not meeting statutory requirements may be excluded.

## Conclusion

In Lopiano v. Lopiano, 752 A.2d 1000 (1998), the Connecticut Supreme Court held that a vested personal-injury judgment existing at the time of dissolution is “property” under § 46b-81 and may be equitably distributed in its entirety, including components for pain and suffering and post-dissolution lost wages, and it affirmed the trial court’s related property, alimony, and attorney’s-fee orders and its exclusion of treating-provider letters.
