## Facts

- A 1975 Declaration of Easements granted the owner of a landlocked commercial parcel (Epstein, dominant estate) a nonexclusive easement over adjoining land (later owned by Kmart, servient estate) “for ingress and egress” and prohibited “obstructions” interfering with free use of the easement area.
- Levitz, a long-time tenant on the dominant parcel, erected an advertising sign in 1963 on the servient parcel with the then-owner’s consent; the sign remained after the 1975 subdivision.
- In 1992, Kmart acquired the servient parcel and planned a shopping center, including concrete islands, curbing, traffic-control devices, and lane markings within the easement area, and relocation/removal of the Levitz sign.
- Epstein claimed the proposed improvements would alter the easement area and substantially interfere with access rights protected by the Declaration’s no-obstruction language.
- Levitz claimed a right to keep the sign in place based on an implied easement or an easement by estoppel.
- After removal to federal court and a bench trial, the district court permanently enjoined Kmart from installing certain barriers and traffic-control devices in the easement area, broadly barred future violations of the Declaration, and held Levitz had an implied easement or easement by estoppel for the sign, enjoining its removal.
- Kmart appealed the scope of the injunction and the ruling recognizing sign-related easement rights.

## Issues

1. Whether Kmart’s proposed traffic and access improvements within the easement area would unlawfully and substantially interfere with Epstein’s ingress/egress easement, and whether the injunction improperly barred reasonable noninterfering measures.
2. Whether Levitz had an easement by implication or an easement by estoppel permitting it to maintain its advertising sign on Kmart’s land.

## Decision

- The court affirmed that certain aspects of Kmart’s plan would substantially interfere with Epstein’s access easement as granted and protected against obstructions.
- The court held the permanent injunction was overly broad because it categorically barred traffic signals, signs, and lane markings even if they were safety-related and did not materially impair ingress and egress.
- The court remanded for the injunction to be modified and narrowly tailored to prohibit only specific improvements that materially impair the easement’s use.
- The court reversed the ruling that Levitz had an implied easement or easement by estoppel to maintain the sign and vacated the injunction preventing Kmart from removing/relocating it.

## Legal Principles

- A servient estate owner may use and improve the burdened land in any manner that does not unreasonably or materially interfere with the easement holder’s use; the dominant estate owner may not enlarge the easement beyond the grant.
- Express easement terms control; where an easement is granted for ingress and egress and bars obstructions, constructions that functionally block or significantly restrict access violate the easement.
- Injunctive relief must be carefully tailored to the specific proven harm; an injunction is improper if it prohibits categories of conduct that may be reasonable and noninterfering.
- An easement by implication requires evidence that, at severance, the parties intended the claimed use to continue as a property right, typically shown by an apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary prior use.
- An easement by estoppel requires material detrimental reliance on another’s representations or conduct; long-standing permissive use and acquiescence, without sufficient detrimental reliance, does not create a vested easement enforceable against a successor owner.

## Conclusion

The Third Circuit protected the dominant estate’s access rights against substantial interference but required the injunction to be limited to obstructive features rather than barring reasonable traffic measures; it also rejected claims that a commercial tenant’s decades-long sign placement created an implied or estoppel-based easement binding the servient owner.


Louis W. Epstein Family Partnership v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762 (3d Cir. 1994)