## Facts

- Michigan’s Secretary of State adopted a policy allowing a change to the sex designation on a Michigan driver’s license or ID only upon presentation of an amended birth certificate reflecting the requested designation.
- The policy did not accept other documentation (e.g., a U.S. passport with an updated gender marker) as proof for changing the sex marker on Michigan identification.
- Under Michigan law, some transgender individuals could obtain an amended Michigan birth certificate only after sex-reassignment surgery.
- Several plaintiffs were born in other states that either did not permit amendment of the sex marker on birth certificates or imposed restrictive requirements, making it impossible for them to satisfy Michigan’s amended-birth-certificate requirement.
- Plaintiffs alleged the policy forced them to carry identification with a sex marker inconsistent with their lived gender and appearance.
- Plaintiffs alleged that presenting mismarked identification effectively disclosed their transgender status to third parties in routine contexts (e.g., employment verification, banking, housing, and interactions with law enforcement).
- Plaintiffs alleged compelled disclosure exposed them to harassment, discrimination, and an increased risk of physical harm, threatening personal security and bodily integrity.
- Plaintiffs brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Secretary of State in her official capacity, asserting (as relevant here) a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim for violation of informational privacy.

## Issues

1. Whether plaintiffs plausibly stated a Fourteenth Amendment informational privacy claim based on a state ID policy that allegedly compelled disclosure of transgender status through an inaccurate sex marker.
2. Whether the alleged risk of harassment and physical violence from such compelled disclosure was sufficient, at the pleading stage, to support constitutional protection for nondisclosure of the information.
3. Whether the state’s asserted interests in administrative accuracy and fraud prevention defeated the claim as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

## Decision

- The court denied the Secretary of State’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
- The court held the complaint plausibly alleged that transgender status is highly personal information and that the policy effectively compelled its disclosure.
- The court held plaintiffs plausibly alleged disclosure created a serious risk to personal security and bodily integrity, not merely stigma or embarrassment.
- The court concluded that weighing the state’s justifications against plaintiffs’ privacy interests required a fuller factual record and could not be resolved on the pleadings.

## Legal Principles

- The Fourteenth Amendment protects, in certain circumstances, an interest in avoiding disclosure of highly personal matters (informational privacy).
- Informational privacy claims are plausibly stated where the information is inherently private and disclosure creates a serious risk to personal security or bodily integrity.
- Government action may implicate informational privacy not only through direct publication, but also by effectively compelling disclosure through policies that foreseeably reveal private information in ordinary transactions.
- At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a court accepts well-pleaded factual allegations as true and asks whether they plausibly state a constitutional violation; asserted governmental interests generally require factual development when plaintiffs plausibly allege infringement of a protected privacy interest.

## Conclusion

The court allowed plaintiffs’ § 1983 action to proceed, holding they plausibly alleged that Michigan’s amended-birth-certificate requirement for changing the sex marker on state identification effectively compelled disclosure of transgender status and, given the alleged risk of serious harm, stated a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment informational privacy claim.


Love v. Johnson, 146 F. Supp. 3d 848 (E.D. Mich. 2015)