Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)

Facts

  • The City of Griffin, Georgia enacted an ordinance making it an offense to distribute “circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind,” free or for sale, within the city without prior written permission from the City Manager.
  • The ordinance deemed unpermitted distribution a “nuisance” and directed police to suppress and abate it.
  • Alma Lovell, a Jehovah’s Witness, distributed religious pamphlets and a magazine in Griffin without seeking permission.
  • Lovell asserted that applying for a permit would conflict with her religious duty to distribute the materials.
  • Lovell was prosecuted under the ordinance, convicted in the city recorder’s court, and sentenced to a fine (with jail time in default of payment).
  • Georgia appellate courts affirmed or declined review; Lovell appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, raising federal constitutional objections.

Issues

  1. Whether freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental rights protected from municipal and state infringement through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  2. Whether a municipal ordinance requiring prior written permission from a city official to distribute “literature of any kind” violates the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an unconstitutional restraint on press freedom.
  3. Whether a defendant prosecuted under a licensing ordinance alleged to be facially invalid may challenge the ordinance without first applying for a permit.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the judgment affirming Lovell’s conviction.
  • The Court held that freedoms of speech and press are fundamental rights protected from state and municipal infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • The Court treated the ordinance as state action because it was adopted under state authority.
  • The Court held the ordinance unconstitutional on its face because it prohibited distribution of literature absent official permission and thereby subjected publication to licensing and censorship.
  • The Court rejected a narrow definition of “press,” holding that pamphlets and leaflets are covered.
  • The Court held Lovell could contest the ordinance’s validity without having sought a permit under it.
  • Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are protected against state and municipal infringement through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Municipal ordinances enacted under state authority constitute state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
  • A broad permitting scheme that conditions distribution of literature on prior approval by an official, without meaningful limits, is a prior restraint inconsistent with press freedom and may be invalid on its face.
  • Constitutional protection for “the press” includes pamphlets, leaflets, and other publications used to communicate information and opinion.
  • A person prosecuted for violating a licensing requirement that is void on its face may challenge its constitutionality without first applying for the license.

Conclusion

The Court invalidated Griffin’s permit requirement for distributing literature because it imposed an official licensing system over publication that operated as censorship, and it confirmed that press freedom protects pamphleteers and applies to states and municipalities through the Fourteenth Amendment.